Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-240 *14 December 1995*

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Bosnia, FRY To Formally Recognize Each Other

AU1412073095 Paris AFP in English
0328 GMT 14 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, Dec 14 (AFP)—Bosnia and Yugoslavia will formally recognize each other on Thursday, U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke announced here.

He said Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Bosnian counterpart Muhamed Sacirbegovic would exchange letters on mutual recognition at the beginning of a meeting in Paris between President Bill Clinton and the presidents of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Holbrooke said Croatia and Yugoslavia "will take a step towards (mutual recognition) but not yet," adding that there remained "some unresolved issues."

"This is a matter of time," the envoy explained. "It's complicated."

Croatia and Yugoslavia, which is now reduced to Serbia and Montenegro, have been at odds over eastern Slavonia, Croatian territory seized by secessionist Serbs.

Under terms of a Balkan peace accord, to be signed here Thursday, the territory is to revert to Croatia.

Both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been part of federal Yugoslavia but broke away, the former in 1991 and the latter a year later.

Yugoslavia today consists of only two republics, Serbia and Montenegro.

A French Foreign Ministry spokesman said France had also been trying to arrange mutual recognition among all the states of ex-Yugoslavia—Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Slovenia—but warned that such a develpment was not imminent.

The presidents of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic, Alija Izetbegovic and Franjo Tudjman, are Thursday to sign the U.S.-brokered peace agreement to end a three-and-a-half-year-old conflict between the Moslem-lead Bosnian government, now supported by Bosnian Croats, and rebel Serbs.

Serb-dominated Yugoslavia exerts significant influence over the Bosnian Serbs and thus its recognition of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina is seen by diplomats as helping to consolidate the peace accord.

Holbrooke said that after Thursday Bosnia will be known simply as Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The name change is to signify its new structure as an independent and unitary state, divided into two entities, Moslem-Croat and Serb.

Holbrooke also announced that a senior U.S. official, reserve Air Force General Jacques Klein, had been named to head a "transitional authority" to oversee the return of eastern Slavonia to Croatia within a year.

Klein had previously been a political advisor to NATO's European commander, General George Joulwan.

Holbrooke said a transfer of power would take place December 19 in Sarajevo between General Bernard Janvier, head of the United Nations Protection Force in ex-Yugoslavia, and Admiral Leighton Smith, NATO commander in the region.

Some 60,000 NATO-led troops are to be deployed in Bosnia to implement the accord.

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Shifting Relations With U.S., Germany Viewed

AU1312143695 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 12 Dec 95 p 4

[Article by Frrok Cupi: "Albania: One Eye on Germany or Under the United States' Skirts?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The officially-fostered postcommunist myth that the U.S. Government cossets the Albanian Government is gradually fading and giving way to reality, even to the eyes of ordinary citizens without any political knowledge. The United States is a great power that considers its political interests on the basis of democratic principles. To those who remember anything of political events, the United States, having studied thousands of things even in Albania, has settled into an established position without cosseting the government, without discriminating against the opposition, and respecting the principles of a democratic state and society. Various things helped to strip away the myth of the United States as a cozy corner for the Albanian Government and the Albanian president, whatever they did. First came the exposure of the members of the U.S.-Albanian lobby before the eyes of the Albanian people. Many of them, whose watches had stopped in World War II, came to Albania and appealed for armed vengeance against all the communists, deputies, judges, procurators, and schoolteachers. Some even boasted of the crimes they had committed when they had fled. However, they erred when they boasted that they themselves were the United States.... The second factor was the not genuinely diplomatic stand taken by former ambassador Ryerson, who spent most of his time either at the rallies of the party-state or inspecting fruit and vegetable markets, just like a communist official. At that time, the embassy of the world's greatest democracy in Tirana was virtually closed to members of the opposition and independent people who did not serve the government. In the end, the members of the Albanian Government themselves destroyed the myth by often trespassing on even the most elementary principles of the rights of the individual, something about which U.S. democracy is highly sensitive. What is the real picture today? As Western analysts write, following the successful Ohio talks the United States has its eye on Albania with regard to the important issue of reducing the armaments and militarization of the important area where the Albanian and Greek borders meet the border of the FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and on Macedonia between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. If a stable peace is achieved in Bosnia, interest in Gjader will be shifted to an East-West axis. However, this depends on the success of the bitter Bosnian peace. Meanwhile, the Albanian Government could exert a deleterious influence, as day by day its provokes irritation in its relations with Greece. The Albanian Government might use this chance of peace in the region as bait in the electoral campaign, hinting to our neighbors and to the Americans, "Stick to us, because there will be instability with the others." From the point of view of political credibility, the time is coming even in Albania when it is not enough for a government merely to make anticommunist noises. A trustworthy government of quality is required. This is all the more true when Kosova is in question. According to U.S. officials and analysts of the Balkans, Bosnia is only the first round in the settling of historically unfinished accounts in the region. Nobody believes that after the Dayton Accords Kosova and the FYROM will not explode. Analysts note that under these circumstances, U.S. policy is to seek allies in the Balkans that can carry the burden of peace and stability, first of all, among their own peoples, and then with their neighbors. The fact that President Gligorov is at present virtually incapacitated is not a helpful coincidence. However, the Western press report that trusted allies are being sought in Albania too. "At the moment, the State Department is seeking allies in Albania and FYROM in order to compensate for their 'lost loves.' U.S. diplomats have long been disappointed in Sali Berisha, whom they call autocratic, unpredictable, and uncooperative." This is what Aleks Papahella, Washington corespondent of the Greek newspaper KATHIMERINI wrote from the White House. "The fact that the Albanian president, having just arrived home from his visit to Washington, dismissed Zef Brozi, chairman of the Supreme Court, and approved a law that leaves minor parties outside parliament has annoyed the Americans. They show every sign of now turning toward former prime minister Fatos Nano...." This report comes from Washington but has in fact infiltrated the entire political and social atmosphere of Albania. But what is the official position now? An extremely vigorous shift of attention toward Germany has now become quite obvious. Remember the frequency of visits by state officials and senior servicemen to Germany? Let us not forget the kind words of a representative of a German foundation and the Albanian president's forthcoming visit to Germany. This is no doubt a civilizing tendency and turning to the German state is a positive opportunity, something that the Albanian opposition is also asking for. But one must ask why official policies have been so tardy in reaching this conclusion, so belated, indeed, that the road to Germany has lain through Saudi Arabia. Is this a sincere turnaround in the direction of Christian civilization? One must doubt this, simply because the Albanian Government, now on the threshold of the election campaign, needs pro-European propaganda. Another question is why Albania is hurrying in the direction of Germany at a time when, as the

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Western press writes, the United States has become disillusioned. There is a fundamental problem here. Does Germany's well-known political stand on the issue of Kosovo demand a different commitment and settlement to the one proposed by the State Department, at a time when the problem of Kosovo will be taken up by the great powers in the wake of a Bosnian settlement? It is evident that Albania has kept an eagle-eye through the keyhole at the process initiated at Dayton, without being able to see the whole.

Starova, German Delegation Discuss Dayton, Kosovo

AU1312143595 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This afternoon, Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova received a delegation of German parliament members led by deputy Herman Hack, charged by Bundestag on relations with Albania.

In his briefing, Mr. Starova focused on the latest developments in the region and the Dayton agreement. He stated that this agreement undoubtedly gives an end to the Bosnian conflict. However, not treating the Kosova issue in this document leaves room for a possible escalation of the conflict. Mr. Starova added that the Albanian side is confident that the Kosova issue should be put on the agenda as soon as possible and that the Dayton agreement, as an important step to extinguishing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, creates hopes for an expeditious solution to this problem as well.

Starova later spoke about the situation of Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], who according to the Albanians themselves, constitute 30-40 percent of the populace.

At the end of his briefing, Mr. Starova summarized the priorities of Albania's foreign policy during the period of democracy and expressed his pleasure over the very good relations with Germany, as well as pointed out Albania's will to continue the same natural line in relations with Germany and other friendly countries.

German Deputy Hack stated that he was well informed and hailed the careful way of treating the Kosova problem by the Albanian side, following the line of dialogue and not of violence. He showed interest in Albania's membership in NATO.

Efficacy of Kosovo Leader's Peace Policy Doubted

AU1312144095 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 9 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Gani Mehmetaj: "Proposals for Autonomy and Albanian 'Silence'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Albanians of Kosova were not enthused by the stand the EU took at Brussels, offering wide autonomy within the framework of a Slav state. At Dayton, even though it was known that Kosovo's representatives would not take part, the demonstrations of the Albanians and the presence of Prime Minister Bukoshi were a testimony to the Kosovars' dissatisfaction and the inevitable need to tackle Kosova when solving all the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Other international decisionmaking bodies have also proposed autonomy, but no Albanian political party in Kosova has welcomed this with enthusiasm; on the contrary, all of them have objected. Meanwhile, President Rugova has repeated the stand of the legitimate leadership that an independent and neutral state of Kosova is a real and reasonable solution for the Albanians, although it will not be the final verdict for the majority of the inhabitants of Kosova. While refraining from angry reaction to the offers of internationally guaranteed autonomy from the EU and the United States, the Albanian political parties and their representatives elected in 1992 are trying to maintain a moderate stand, in order not to annoy their allies in whom they place their hopes for a fair and lasting decision.

The Albanian question in the former Yugoslavia is strongly present among the international community and has not been marginalized, President Ibrahim Rugova considers. Dr. Rugova has often said that we are ready for unconditional dialogue with Serbia as equal partners and in the presence of a third party. The majority of ethnic Albanians support this policy as a first stage toward a final settlement, whose second stage would be national unification. There is significant dissent and sometimes bitter dispute about ways and means. Although no political party either in Kosova or Albania favors violent methods, the repeated incantations of politicians and international institutions about not changing borders are viewed with a considerable dose of suspicion. Since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, borders have not been what they used to be. New states and a new reality have arisen. All the nations of the south Slavs have created their states. The Albanians say that even the Macedonians, a new nation created after 1945, have created their nation state with the support of the international community. Eminent Albanian intellectuals in Kosova and Albania wonder why such a right is therefore inadmis-

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sible for the Albanians of Kosova, with the possibility of unification.

While most people consider that President Berisha and Albanian diplomacy have done a great deal to involve Albania in Europe after 50 years of isolation and to internationalize the cause of Kosova, they likewise do not respond enthusiastically to the insistence on not changing the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Many of them do not even like statements about the human and national rights of the Albanians in Kosova. They look askance at President Rugova's frequent reiteration that the Albanians are ready for dialogue with Serbia. "If we have said that once, we have said it again and again," Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party in Albania and a well-known writer, has said in an interview. "Milosevic knows what we are offering," he continues. "If we go on like this, one day we will give in."

Voices in Kosova also speak out against Rugova's policy of peace, although even those individuals who are most destructive in their criticism do not offer any clear vision of action. Political observers here see that those who have launched the offensive are left-wingers who wrap themselves in the aura of counselors from exalted quarters. Former communist officials from Kosova are also bitter in their attacks, and consider that an independent Kosova is a utopia. They therefore propose a model of autonomy, or the Republic of Kosova within a rump Yugoslavia. However, the tone of criticisms and alternatives in their interviews in the Serbian media differ significantly from what they say in the Albanian press in Kosova. In the former, they announce that Rugovo's option has been exhausted, and they therefore offer compromise proposals that they claim are more acceptable to Belgrade. Meanwhile, they are not ashamed to deny themselves in the Kosova media, swearing that they are ardent supporters of President Rugova.

Bitter historical experience and current political trends make the Albanians suspicious of the decisions of Europe over the Albanian question in the Balkans. A repetition of the year 1913 would be a national tragedy. The Albanians are not Bosnians; they have access to the sea and are not isolated like Bosnia-Herzegovina, an authoritative politician and writer in Tirana has stated. They can avail themselves of the all the resources they need for self- defense, he continues. This does not exclude the determined insistence on peaceful means that has been emphasized hitherto, analysts and politicians here state. This must indeed be the main weapon of action. However, many people wonder whether this will be an effective method and whether international decisionmaking bodies will know how to appreciate it.

Army General, Zhulali Receive Turkish Delegation

AU1312143395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Turkish military delegation presided over by Brigadier General (Yagus Yaltsin) today held talks with Gen. Sheme Kosova, chief of the Army General Staff. The problems discussed at the meeting were related to the 1996-97 cooperation program.

General Kosova emphasized the Turkish Army's continuous assistance to the Albanian Army and the possibilities that this cooperation be increased and become proficient next year.

Brig. Gen. (Yalstin) stated that their desire is to further boost military cooperation to preserve peace and stability in our region. He stressed the concern of Army Gen. Karaday, chief of the Turkish Army staff, to help the Albanian Army become more efficient and modern.

Defense Minister Safet Zhulali also received the Turkish military delegation at a special working meeting today.

Cabinet Approves Bill To Create Duty-Free Zones

AU1312143795 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 12 Dec 95 p 5

[Report by Arlinda Causholli: "'Towns' Without Customs Duty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—They will be like towns in themselves, yet more privileged than usual. All persons who settle within their bounds will be exempt from all customs duties. All goods destined to enter these zones or are produced within them will be entirely exempt from all duty. At the same time, strikes by workers employed in these areas will be forbidden by law. Like many other states of Central and East Europe, Albania will also have these "half-way houses" during the transition phase, and will support the market economy by what are also called "duty-free zones." Yesterday's meeting of the Meksi cabinet signed a bill that will soon be submitted to parliament for approval. The government has prepared the legal framework to create these areas, whose aim will be to create scope for investment and attract as many foreign businessmen as possible. They will thus be in a position to compete with the economies of other countries. There are 18 articles in this bill approving in principle this important step for the Albanian economy. These "towns" will include trade and industrial operations, processing for exports, different services, and "duty free shops" that

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will be built near ports, airports, and at international road junctions. The organization of these areas will be the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, and all their activities will be based on contracts entered into between the private or public entrepreneur and the General Directorate for the Administration of Free Zones, which is to be created. According to the bill, the removal of all customs duty will greatly help turnover. However, there will also be two possible kinds of concessions in Profits Tax, exempting activities of all kinds from Profits Tax for a period of four or seven years. Both strikes and lockouts, i.e., work stoppages enforced by an employer, will be forbidden for a period of 10 years. It is planned for disagreements to be resolved by talks alone, or else in the courts under whose jurisdiction the free zones will be situated. The strike issue has met with objections from the Justice Ministry, but Industry Ministry officials explained that prohibiting work stoppages for 10 years will greatly reassure foreign investors. This law is applied in other European states too and has had a significant effect. The ministers approved the operation and organization of the free zones in principle. Now the deputies have the last word.

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Meciar on Achievements, Conflict With Kovac

AU1312174595 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 9 Dec 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with Slovak President Vladislav Meciar by Vasil Zakhariev; place and date not given: "Slovakia Is Different From the Picture Painted Outside Its Borders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zakhariev] Mr. Meciar, what are the most important results of your visit to Bulgaria? How do you see the future of Bulgarian-Slovak relations?

[Meciar] First of all we find it necessary to intensify the political dialogue at all levels. We must restore trade between the two countries. The current trade exchange is very low—only $21 million per year. In Sofia we discussed the posibility of forming a capital market. The process of privatization is underway in both countries. There is the possibility to participate through investments.

Within the framework of multilateral cooperation we want to help Bulgaria become a CEFTA member by 1 January 1997. We are opening a new stage in our relations.

[Zakhariev] You mentioned that Slovak groups are interested in participating in Bulgaria's privatization. What major companies want to invest in Bulgaria?

[Meciar] Slovakia's privatization experience should interest other countries. We are doing many things well and in a different manner. The Slovak enterprises are in a good shape—they are intensively modernizing, concentrate capital, and could participate in privatization in other countries. In this realm there is only the economic interests factor. Our delegation includes representatives of business circles from all branches—metallurgy, machine-building, and the rubber, food, and beer industries. They all signed agreements with Bulgarian partners.

Our businessmen are interested not only in privatization, but also in investments. They want to import new technologies, provide job security in our country, and cooperate in the markets around our country.

[Zakhariev] What specifically will happen in 1996?

[Meciar] We have signed a free trade agreement. Next year customs will decrease 50 percent. The year after—another 25 percent, and three years from now they will be completely eliminated.

Life itself will help us to eliminate the obstacles in tourism and transportation. As of 1 October 1995 the Slovak koruna is convertible abroad. This will facilitate the development of tourism because the National Bank of Slovakia will be free to exchange unlimited amounts of money.

[Zakhariev] Is there a consensus in Slovakia about joining the EU, and how do you view a possible membership in NATO and the Western European Union?

[Meciar] We are an EU associate member. All political forces in Slovakia agree that we must participate in the European integration, However, there are differences regarding the manner of joining. It also depends on the EU and on the speed with which the changes in our countries will take place. Those changes are very educational, especially against the background of the situation in Germany. After unification the East German economy simply collapsed. This shows that our economy must reach the level of the developed countries.

Different opinions also exist in the associated states themselves. Some of them think that rapidly joining the EU will allow them to draw funds from the EU. There are not enough EU funds, however, to meet all demands.

Slovakia has declared its interest in joining NATO. However, we do not want a Europe divided into two blocs.

[Zakhariev] You proposed to intensify cooperation among the EU associated members. What will the goal of this cooperation be?

[Meciar] Slovakia proposed a meeting of the associated members, where they could express their positions. The adaption to the association requires a market economy capable of withstanding EU competition and integrating in Europe.

[Zakhariev] How do you assess today the velvet divorce between Slovakia and the Czech Republic?

[Meciar] The separation of Slovakia and the Czech Republic is a unique phenomenon that allowed us to create an independent state. Thus the entire world opened to us. Naturally, the establishment of a state posed new tasks of the kind we did not know in the past. We had to construct the state's structure, economic basis, and monetary system. External relations had to be established so that our state could obtain its place among the other states. This process is already behind us. Now we are maintaining good relations with the Czech Republic. We created a customs union. We have no contradictions and we respect each other.

We positively assess the separation. There are still people who look back with nostalgia, but Slovakia's good results prove that we were right.

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[Zakhariev] It is well known that your cabinet does not have especially warm relations with President Kovac. Do you think that friction between the institutions is something normal in the pluralistic society, where the division of power must be observed?

[Meciar] Slovakia is a democratic state with a democratically elected president. We have a coalition cabinet. Our courts are independent. Only the president has problems in this situation. There are certain contradictions, but we want to resolve them ourselves. We find it painful when the president says things that damage the state. Our parliament voted its nonconfidence in the president, and the same applies to the cabinet and the state organs. However, the president decided that this is not important. This is not my personal confrontation, but a confrontation between a person and the constitutional institutions. I do not find it easy to talk about this abroad. However, this is not Slovakia's most important problem, despite the fact that the Austrian, German, and U.S. media are discussing it extensively. Slovakia is different from the picture painted outside its borders.

Assessment of Videnov's 'Handpicked' Advisers

AU1312183595 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 23 Nov 95 p 11

[Article by Emil Raykov: "Videnov and His Advisers; the Chancellery That Pulls the Strings in Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Everyone thinks that Mr. Videnov has shut himself away within an unhealthily narrow circle of cronies.

He almost never meets with prominent businessmen, intellectuals, or journalists. It is claimed that even the ministers are largely isolated, because they were recruited under pressure from various group interests inside and even outside the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP].

Behind every minister stands either a certain party faction or an economic group. However, the same is not true of the prime minister's advisers; they are handpicked by Videnov himself. Today, his private office is like a "shadow cabinet," and it is probably much more important than the real cabinet.

Who are the members of this "shadow cabinet"?

Undoubtedly, the greatest influence is held by the two Krasimirs—Krasimir Raydovski, head of the press service, and Krasimir Nikolov, chief of the prime minister's private office. At almost the same level as them are Videnov's economic advisor Vladimir Zheglov and his foreign policy advisor Filip Ishpekov. Next in line come Videnov's spokesman Nikola Baltov and Valentin Korkinov, chief secretary of the Council of Ministers. These people have direct access to the prime minister and are most often consulted by him.

With Zheglov and Ishpekov, Videnov often even discusses future decisions that the government is to adopt. Together with Raydovski, Ishpekov also has his say regarding the cadre games surrounding Bulgarian diplomacy.

The Arabist Ishpekov, a former diplomat, is an invisible but important factor in the bargaining with the president concerning ambassadorial appointments. He is regarded as the prime minister's corrective to Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski, who is one of ex-Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov's men.

Videnov appears to have reservations concerning his No. 1 diplomat for a number of reasons. First, Pirinski is regarded as Lukanov's man. A strong lobby within the BSP tried to get Pirinski appointed as deputy minister of economics, so that his appointment as foreign minister was a tactical move. Second, it is said that Pirinski is a possible BSP candidate for the next presidential elections. All of this cannot fail to irritate Videnov.

Many people were amazed at Krasimir Raydovski becoming head of the Government Press Center, and asked: Why him? The answer is now clear—his job is not so much to brief the journalists as to inform the prime minister himself and to maintain good links with the structures that supply information.

Raydovski used to be an intelligence officer on the payroll of the First Chief Directorate of State Security. As he himself has admitted, he worked under diplomatic cover in Germany. He is a partner in three companies belonging to the Orion Group. Probably for this reason, the other groups suddenly found themselves to be outsiders.

It is claimed that Lyubomir Kolarov brought Raydovski into contact with Videnov long before the last parliamentary elections. Even at that time, he began to supply valuable information on Bulgarian political life. Raydovski's contacts with Greek journalists also proved useful for the Socialist leaders image abroad. However, the relations of the press service chief with Bulgarian journalists are not going particularly well, with the exception being the newspaper from which his subordinate Nevena Gyurova was recruited.

Several months ago Raydovski's wife was given a post in SOTI [Service for Operative and Technical Information], the service in the Interior Ministry that under the law "checks" on telephone subscribers only after obtaining a permit from the prosecution service.

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Next in line to Videnov's top-level advisers come his economic advisor Ivan Angelov and his parliamentary secretary Plamen Vulkanov. They are known as the "terminators" who put the prime minister's ideas into practice. They are able to do good work in this direction without Videnov being committed personally.

Professor Ivan Angelov, the former advisor of Georgi Atanasov and Lukanov, seems so firmly established in his post offering advice on various economic issues that even teams of experts cannot shake his self-confidence. With the aid of press service advisor Nevena Gyurova, he utterly defeated the energy industry in many articles in the press. His analysis gave Zhan [Videnov] the courage to appoint his own man Rumen Ovcharov deputy chairman of the Committee on Power Supply.

Now Prof. Angelov has been given a new task: to restore Balkanbank to financial health. Apart from anything else, he will certainly have to destroy the hopes of Multigroup, which wants to establish a lasting presence in this bank.

In principle, Videnov gives strong backing to his officials and appoints them to key posts. Only one of them has fallen by the wayside, namely, parliamentary secretary Plamen Nikolov, who was replaced early on by Plamen Vulkanov.

In other cases, however, Videnov displays enviable patience, as in the case of Interior Minister Nachev, who aroused much controversy. This is probably because the real chief in the chancellery of the Interior Ministry is not Nachev, but Chief Secretary Paraskev Paraskevov, who has frequent meetings with Raydovski.

Plamen Nikolov was fired from state employment because of the affair with the appointment of the chief of the State Savings Bank. He was blamed for the fiasco of the first parliamentary vote on Bistra Dimitrova's candidature, backed by the cabinet. Nikolov should have warned his employer that certain Socialist deputies were to vote with the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] against Dimitrova, to allow Videnov to get them to rejoin the straight and narrow path in good time.

With icy silence the prime minister ignored Nikolov's subsequent revelations in a Sofia newspaper of the dealings in the Council of Ministers' kitchen, but is reported to have been very annoyed. Evidently, he will not have any such problems with the lawyer Vulkanov. The former National Assembly deputy seems to be the complete opposite of Nikolov. However, as to what he is actually like, one could find this out from the Board of Directors of Neftokhim, to which Vulkanov has been co-opted by decision of the Council of Ministers.

Krasimir Nikolov, the chief of the prime minister's private office, is undoubtedly the most experienced member of Videnov's chancellery team. He has held many similar posts in the past. In the beginning, he had the reputation of being a faceless civil servant, but recently he has been emerging as a strong personality in the Council of Ministers. Nikolov is the official substitute for the Council of Ministers Chief Secretary Korkinov when the latter is absent.

The chief of Videnov's private office was sent to join the Supervisory Council of Serdika just before the row broke out about the transfusion of funds into the Bulgarian Agroindustrial Bank. Government intervention was certainly needed to restore control over the situation and the funds.

Krasimir Nikolov's star shone as the row developed over Topenergy, where he is already keeping a close eye on affairs from the company's Supervisory Council, together with Rumen Ovcharov. Shortly before this, Nikolov was chairman of the Board of Bulgargaz. He gained his position in Topenergy as a result of many trips to Moscow, where he worked as a diplomat in the eighties. He, if anyone, has extensive links with Russia.

It is said that the two Krasimirs [Nikolov and Raydovski] head the two centers close to the prime minister that compete with one another for influence over Videnov.

Videnov's most active assistant is his economic adviser Vladimir Zheglov. Formerly a journalist working for RABOTNICHESKO DELO, a founder of the Business Data Agency (which is now run by his brother Ivaylo), and a partner in the BULGARSKI BIZNES newspaper, Zheglov made the prime minister's acquaintance during their student years. He acts as the prime minister's emissary in the most delicate negotiations, including talks concerning Topenergy. Zheglov joined the boards of the enlarged Biokhim Commercial Bank and Neftokhim.

Nikola Baltov's previous service as parliamentary secretary for the Finance Ministry when Stoyan Aleksandrov was finance minister probably suited him for his present post as government spokesman. Now he frequently pops up at Videnov's side, acting from time to time as a Spanish interpreter. It is not clear what Videnov uses him for. Most likely, Baltov is a reserve member of the team, to be brought onto the field in extreme necessity. He lost his post on the Supervisory Council of Sofiabank when the latter and the Serdika Commercial Bank merged to form the Biokhim Bank.

Chief Secretary Valentin Korkinov has the reputation of being a dry technocrat who does not venture to take a single step without prior approval. Korkinov sits on the

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boards of the United Bulgarian Bank and the Sheraton Hotel. Before joining the Council of Ministers, the chief secretary worked in the BSP-owned Konsulttrade Company. He also should probably be regarded as a reserve player.

It appears that the prime minister wants to maintain a permanent quota of close advisers who, as "substitutes" in key sectors of the economy, will also solve political tasks. Under Todor Zhivkov, a similar institution monitored big construction projects.

This is a general description of the faces that Videnov sees every morning. They include no very beautiful women or handsome men. Videnov does not have his Brzezinski or Kissinger, but his advisers are all devoted to him and enjoy his trust.

It is possible to some extent to draw a parallel with Filip Dimitrov's [former prime minister of Union of Democratic Forces] private office. In the beginning, F.D. met many people, but gradually withdrew into a narrow circle. Videnov did this from the very outset. F.D. was surrounded by extravagant and hysterical pseudointellectuals, while Videnov's entourage consists of people lacking any outward brilliance or pretensions. However, at least half of them are familiar with the mechanisms of real power. What the two leaders share in common is that Videnov meets few people and trusts even fewer. It is possible that this gives him a rather narrow picture of Bulgaria.

Videnov has the interesting custom of drinking coffee between eight and nine every morning with Krasimir Nikolov, Raydovski, Gyurova, Baltov, and the psychologist Lyubov Vidinska, an adviser in the press service. The latter advises Videnov about his image, often in the company of the political expert Vasil Penev, the husband of Mariya Pirgova, who played an important role in Lyuben Berov's office.

At these morning meetings the most frequent topic discussed is the media. The conversation proceeds in a calm, creative atmosphere, to help Zhan set himself up for the day and for the momentous decisions that he has to face.

The ministers, of course, are unhappy about this. In their view, Videnov's preference toward trusting his advisers cuts him off from the real problems, and every one of Videnov's people tries to interfere in government. It is difficult to say whether this is true. Clearly the people of Multigroup are discontented, while the Orion people are delighted, and the Tron people are unexpectedly managing to adapt to the situation.

However, it appears that the administration lacks big ideas and a strategic view of the country's future. This may be because the prime minister has no contacts with the big figures in present-day Bulgaria.

What quality differentiates average politicians from great ones? Curiosity, perhaps. Reagan was a mediocre figure but his natural curiosity led him to associate with America's most intelligent minds, and this elevated him high above the other presidents.

So far at least, Zhan Videnov does not give the impression of being a very inquisitive person.

National Assembly Adopts Armed Forces Bill

AU1312201695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A parliamentary task which lasted almost five years, and which engaged the 37th National Assembly for seven months, was completed today: The Bill on Defense and Armed Forces was adopted on 13 December.

The bill fills a vacuum in our legislation after the adoption of the new constitution, Deputy Lyuben Petrov said, and added that the bill which was adopted confirms the democratic principles of civil and parliamentary control over the Armed Forces.

Ivan Glushkov from the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] parliamentary faction greeted the Armed Forces with the new bill, and expressed his conviction that it will serve as a foundation to further construct the Bulgarian Army as a modern army.

The bill obliges the cabinet to introduce within three months after its publication the draft bill on alternative military service.

Parties Denounce BSP Position on Kurdzhali

AU1312173195 Sofia PRAVA I SVOBODI in Bulgarian 8 Dec 95 p 2

[Declaration of the National Assembly Factions of the Rights and Freedoms Movement, Union of Democratic Forces, and People's Union: "Dangerous Manipulation of Public Opinion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We live at a fateful time of transition and consolidation of democratic principles and forms of managing the country. The municipal elections are behind us. Instead of consolidating the achievements that have been effected until now, the elections returned us to the alarming past. We are witnessing dangerous tendencies aimed at restoring the nationalism in its crudest forms and attempts to create a direct ethnic confrontation.

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The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], as a basic champion of this tension, again proved that nationalism is its basic election method and postelection manner of behavior. A dangerous manipulation of public opinion is being conducted.

The 1995 municipal election took place for the BSP under the slogan "Sofia and Kurdzhali." We are proud of the fact that precisely at those two places democracy won. The BSP engaged its entire power in the Kurdzhali election campaign—the National Assembly, cabinet, high-ranking state employees, leaders of economic and financial departments, and, please note, Mr. Zlatko Pilev, director of the Regional Directorate of the Interior Ministry.

This gentleman openly joined the BSP election campaign, something that represents a crude violation of the laws and an abuse of the respect and authority of a depoliticized state institution. We all know that the former police structures were the basic lever of conducting the revival process.

Statements and open calls for an ethnic vote on the part of high-ranking BSP officials, such as Mr. Zhan Videnov, chairman of the BSP Supreme Council and prime minister of the Republic of Bulgaria, Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, BSP deputies and others, exacerbated the situation even more. National Assembly Chairman Academician Blagovest Sendov, also participated in the election campaign.

On 12 November 1995 municipal elections were held in Kurdzhali. Since then illegal activities of the government have been continuing. Those actions are expressed in the behavior of Mr. Angel Naydenov, oblast manager of Khaskovo Oblast. In a violation of Article 23 of the Municipal Self-Administration Bill he refuses to convene the Oblast Council and allow its members to be sworn in, despite the decision of the Oblast Election Commission and the documents that have been issued, and which confirm the election results. We are amazed by the fact that, despite the existence of precisely the same conditions, the elected BSP mayors in Nesebur and other places have been allowed to assume office.

The goal is clear—to create a dangerous anarchy and social tension, and thus discredit democracy.

The BSP and its government are fully responsible for the situation that emerged in Kurdzhali.

We appeal to all democratic political forces and prudently thinking people to defend legality and democracy in our motherland, the Republic of Bulgaria!

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Prague Lifts Sanctions Against Serbia, Montenegro

LD1412133995 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 14 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic Vaclav Havel has signed a law lifting sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The Czech Republic is thus lifting for its part the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposed by the UN Security Council in 1992. The then Czechoslovakia also joined the sanctions.

The Czech parliament decided to lift the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro on 8 December following an agreement on the peaceful settlement to the conflict and mutual relations reached in Dayton, America, by Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Klaus 'Skeptical' About Lasting Peace in Bosnia

AU1412080095 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 8 Dec 95 p 3

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Tomas Chalupa in Prague on 7 December: "The Amount of Minimum Wages Is Only an Excuse for the Trade Unions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In our regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, we have been speaking today, among other things, about the level of the minimum wage and the reasons that are leading the trade unions to threaten not to sign the general agreement. We have also dealt with the concept of financing health care and problems with Army contracts. Furthermore, we have returned in the interview to the prime minister's visit to the United States and his opinion on the solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Chalupa] The government decided on 6 December to raise the minimum wage by 300 korunas [Kc] [from Kc2,200 to Kc2,500 per month]. It does not seem enough, however, to the trade unions, and they are threatening not to sign the general agreement. Do you think the minimum wage level is a good reason for refusing to sign the general agreement?

[Klaus] No, I really do not believe it. The minimum wage debate is just a good excuse and a very simple one at that. I do not believe it is the real reason. This issue is truly negligible in its significance and not worth a dispute. It is certainly not important enough not to sign the general agreement. On the other hand, we all know that the main actual impact of this sum is elsewhere. It is that, based on this amount, it is determined how much money from the state budget will go to the health insurance system for citizens who are not gainfully employed—that is, above all, children and pensioners. The increase in the minimum wage approved on Wednesday represents almost 2 billion korunas more for the health insurance system. I would understand it if someone were fighting for a larger contribution to the health insurance system, but I do not believe this is what the trade unionists are doing or what they want.

[Chalupa] Minister Strasky briefed the public on Monday about a concept of financing health care that relies with the responsibility of patients to a greater degree than hitherto. How does this concept correspond to your ideas of financing health care?

[Klaus] When I introduced the idea of individual accounts two years ago, it seemed to everybody a bizarre idea. It was more of a curiosity than a feasible step. But we have moved on during these two years, and today it is a matter discussed ever more frequently. At any rate, I am in favor of such a solution. In the speech I am to deliver on Saturday morning at the congress of the Czech College of Physicians in Olomouc, I will certainly be speaking about this, too. Nevertheless, and that no longer is my task, the completion and details of this proposal will not come easily and it will not be tomorrow.

[Chalupa] During your visit to the United States, you met with many important politicians and economists. Your talks with Strobe Talbott and Richard Holbrooke certainly did not avoid the questions of the solution to the Bosnian crisis. Do you believe the implementation of the Dayton Agreement will actually lead to peace in this region? If this does not happen, is there danger of the war spreading to other regions of Europe, as mentioned by President Clinton, for instance?

[Klaus] I am absolutely convinced that the massive deployment of troops will lead to tranquilization of the situation in former Yugoslavia. That is also the main reason the Czech Republic is sending troops there. Thus, I certainly expect a short-term effect, and there is no doubt that millions of people in that region will let out a sigh of relief. Nevertheless, it is certain that this peace will not be absolute. It certainly will not be so that all of the weapons will be handed in to someone without a shot being fired. The question is, however, what the long-term prospects for peace in Bosnia are, a peace that would be feasible even without this massive military operation and last even after the troops have withdrawn from Bosnia. In this respect, I am rather more skeptical and believe that I am also a little more skeptical than the U.S. officials with whom I discussed it at length and in detail.

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[Chalupa] Another Army contract, this time on heating all of the military facilities, has been questioned. What effect do these facts have on the trustworthiness of the Army, not only by the Czech public but also abroad?

[Klaus] I believe that abroad they are used to such issues as questioning army contracts and that this is standard of any democratic country. In this particular instance, it is more of a problem for the Defense Ministry than for the Army and military commanders. We have received many signals that the situation is not ideal. After all, everybody certainly knows that within a short period I have already ordered the third fundamental material from the defense minister, in which I ask that all the logic of placing Army orders be reassessed. I was not satisfied with the first two and, therefore, returned them to be redrafted. The second signal that not absolutely everything is ideal is that the ministry itself canceled some of its previous decisions, most recently with the Unisys firm, which was to supply an information system. Undoubtedly, it is a problem. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it will affect the degree of trustworthiness of the Czech Army or the Czech Republic.

Presidents Havel, Klestil Plan Bosnia Conference

96P20155A

[FBIS Media Note] According to a Czech Press Agency (CTA) report, President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and President Thomas Klestil of Austria indicated at their 11 December meeting in Seefeld, Austria, that a conference about Bosnia that will "suggest ways the future Europe should react to similar problems" and that, in Klestil's words, is to deal mainly "with the spiritual-philosophical and religious-political aspects of nationalism," will take place in Prague and Vienna. Klestil did not specify when.

Havel, stressing that even smaller countries can do a lot to contribute substantially to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, added that "the Bosnia and Herzegovina Month [a series of cultural events held recently in Prague] was one example of moral and political support, [but] we can also participate in Bosnia's postwar reconstruction. Sending Czech soldiers to Bosnia is a concrete expression of such help."

The two presidents also agreed that the Bosnia issue and its postwar development should be the topic of the next meeting of Central European presidents (CTA, 11 December).

Havel Discusses Nuclear Arms, Japan

AU1312144695 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 8 Dec 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by Olga Skalkova en route from Hiroshima to Prague on 6 December: "The Liquidation of Nuclear Arms Is Linked to the Worldwide Victory of Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Skalkova] Some information is missing in the memorial to the victims of Hiroshima—why was the bomb dropped and why precisely on Hiroshima? There is not even a mention of the U.S. leaflets that warned the population of the coming attack.

[Havel] Although I do not consider myself an expert on this issue, it is true that several small question marks exist over the dropping of the bomb. I do not believe that leaflets addressed to the population were the right thing to do. In my opinion, an emphatic message should have been addressed to the emperor, stating that a bomb would be dropped in three days, giving the technical data and consequences of the bomb, stating where it was developed and by which scientists, and stating that there were more such bombs. It might have been more effective. Nothing like that, as far as I know, happened. Nevertheless, I repeat, I am no expert. I do not believe that leaflets are the best way to send a warning. Imagine that you are on the way home. Before you pull out your glasses, you throw out the leaflet.

[Skalkova] Do you believe it is in order to suppress the missing information inasmuch as it does not make any difference at all to the Hiroshima tragedy as it is perceived by the world?

[Havel] I am against any suppression. I am a friend of the truth regardless of who benefits or loses. In this instance, however, it may have a special aspect. On the one hand, it is likely that, at the time they built the museum, they neither wanted to admit the entire extent of Japan's guilt nor U.S. responsibility for what happened in Hiroshima. All of this, it seems, was pushed into the background. The museum came into being at the time of a certain security friendship between the United States and Japan, full of mutual diplomatic regard. The next generation to renovate the memorial may fill in the blanks. Nonetheless, all of this may have a favorable aspect—the purpose of the Hiroshima monument is not to point out historical data but rather to the fact of the atom bomb, regardless of who would use it against whom. If this was the reason for suppressing other information, one can respect it.

[Skalkova] In your opinion, how did Japan manage to come to terms with its role in World War II?

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[Havel] It seems that there is something like a continuity of national consciousness, conscience, or identity. The sons and grandsons occasionally have a hard time coming to terms with what their fathers and grandfathers did. Something like a collective guilt feeling is passed from generation to generation, after all. It can take various forms. It can take the form of excusing one's own deeds or softening their impact or arguing that there were fewer victims than the other side claims. It can also take the form that was demonstrated at the Hiroshima conference on the future of hope by a certain Japanese professor—he said that the brutality of the Japanese in Asia is being discussed, while the Americans also did peculiar and unclean things. He demonstrated one of the ways to lie to oneself about one's own responsibility. Another variety is self-flagellation. We could observe this in the generation of the late 1960's and early 1970's in Germany. People who had nothing in common with Nazism suffered from a self-flagellation complex. It had a lot of damaging political consequences. There are many ways of avoiding the truth, but the simplest and most correct approach is to face it. To name it, consider all the aspects, and not hide anything, but, at the same time, not be enslaved by it. One must not become a prisoner of the past.

[Skalkova] This year, you took part in the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in various parts of the world. The conference on the future of hope in Hiroshima was a symbolic conclusion to all of them. Do you feel that the defeated power Japan approached the celebrations in a similar way to Germany?

[Havel] I do not know. It is hard to judge. It seems to me, however, that both of these countries have the best of intentions to separate themselves from the past and look forward. They want to become members of the Security Council and are very concerned that they play the role of democratic pillars in the future world arrangement. Their will cannot be doubted. A different matter altogether is how they are managing to cope with it sentimentally. Apparently, a broad scale of feelings exists among both the Japanese and the Germans. Some Japanese politicians recently conveyed an adequate quantity of significant apologies to various Asian countries, but they always added a negligibly small insensitive affront. This, in itself, shows that even the politicians have difficulties in overcoming the cross-generation feeling of national solidarity. It even seems that the Japanese were more noncommittal in their apologies than the Germans. That may have something to do with Japanese pride and other traditional Japanese values.

[Skalkova] Do you believe that politicians, generals, and arms dealers learned their lessons and that humanity has a hope for the future?

[Havel] The topic of nuclear arms has two levels—a philosophical one and a political one. The philosophical one is a result of one part of human reason or spirit overtaking another. The age of rational modern science is capable of inventing the most fantastic things, which are, however, morally neutral and can serve or destroy man. This applies to the unleashing of nuclear power, genetic engineering, television, the information highway, and whatever. They can be used for good or evil. In themselves, they are neither good nor evil. The rational part of human reason has developed fantastically, but another part of the human spirit has dwindled in comparison and drags behind—responsibility and conscience, which should maintain permanent control over the use of inventions. The topic of nuclear arms is only a small element in a broader issue: To what degree is man capable of preventing his inventions from destroying him? Then there is the political side to the issue. It is very simple. As long as there is a danger that various totalitarian aggressive regimes could develop or even possess and use nuclear arms, quite understandably, no democratic country will give them up. The worldwide liquidation of nuclear arms is tied to the worldwide victory of democracy.

[Skalkova] In our country, Japan is a synonym for state-of-the-art technical equipment and a developed industrial country. Are you aware of something else that has been neglected and by which the world and the Czech Republic could be inspired?

[Havel] Undoubtedly. There is Japanese politeness, for instance. Second, and of course most important, there is Japanese dependability. If something is planned for a certain second, it must take place. Third, there is Japanese loyalty; allegiance to the family, the firm, the enterprise, and the state. The kamikaze pilots were so slavishly loyal to their emperor and the state that they did what the emperor ordered, including sacrifice their own lives. They perceived the question of whether the state is right or wrong, whether it does evil or good, as one that was not theirs to deal with. I do not say it was correct, but something of that discipline and loyalty certainly would not harm us. Another thing we undoubtedly could value in Japan is the sense for nature and the respect for the environment that is rooted in Shintoism. Man is perceived as a part of nature and the cosmos. Some of this still remains in present-day Japan.

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Klaus: Reducing Inflation Is Paramount Objective

AU1312172995 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 8 Dec 95 p 1

[Report by "pra": "Reducing Inflation Remains Government Priority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Minimizing inflation remains the principal objective of economic policy, and the Cabinet's success in this respect is beyond doubt. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus made this statement in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday and denied the request by communist deputy Dalibor Matulka that a price moratorium be declared. Only the Czech Republic among all of the postcommunist countries has single-digit inflation that continues to decline. According to his estimates, this year's rate of price growth should not exceed 8 percent. He declared the moratorium unnecessary, and the Cabinet "has not considered it even for a second."

In reply to a question from Jan Krycer (Bohemian and Moravian Center Union) the prime minister said that the government intends to subsidize bus transport to the sum of 541 million korunas. The biggest problem is decline in demand—as it is, only some 30 percent of the capacity of the bus operators is used now. Economic calculations maintain that every bus must be occupied on average by at least 26 passengers. In fact, however, the average bus carries only 21 passengers.

Klaus reiterated that the convergence of the Czech Republic with NATO is one of the priorities of Czech foreign policy. Nevertheless, integration into the alliance will not take place immediately, and there will be enough time for this issue to become the subject of public debate. He pointed out that the defense spending of neutral countries exceeds the cost incurred by countries integrated in collective defense systems.

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Letter From Hungary's Kovacs on Language Law

AU1312183495 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 8 Dec 95 p 4

["Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Laszlo Kovacs's Letter to Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk," dated 20 November]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Dear Minister:

I note with satisfaction the encouraging recent development of our bilateral relations, which could continue in a similar spirit in the future. In line with our intentions, the basic treaty has laid down these prospects and has given further impetus to the process of our European integration. This is why the Government of the Hungarian Republic greatly deplores that, on 15 November 1995, the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved a law on the protection of the Slovak language, which, in our judgment, is at odds with European legal norms, international commitments assumed by both countries, and bilateral commitments laid down in the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty.

Considering the values of democracy, human rights, and a law-governed state, the further improvement of our good-neighborly relations, and the historic reconciliation between our countries, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and National Assembly Chairman Zoltan Gal have communicated to their Slovak counterparts concern about the draft law. Within the framework of talks between the heads of our governments in Berlin on 10 November, despite the failure to reach a consensus on this problem and on acceptable possibilities for solving it, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar proposed that we make use of the possibilities offered by the Council of Europe to resolve this issue and that we enter into consultations with its experts. I was pleased that your prime minister later confirmed this proposal in a public pronouncement.

In the spirit of the above and with the intention of avoiding a situation that might lead to a deterioration of our bilateral relations and damage our common objectives and interests, I propose that, in conformity with European norms concerning the solution to disputes and with commitments laid down in our basic treaty, we request jointly, as equal partners, the participation of the Council of Europe's experts.

In the event of our agreement of principle, I will send you without delay, through diplomatic channels, the Hungarian draft of a common letter to the secretary-general of the Council of Europe.

I am looking forward to your prompt reply.

Regards,

Laszlo Kovacs

20 November 1995

Schenk Replies to Letter

AU1312183795 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 8 Dec 95 p 4

[Letter by Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk in reply to Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs's 20 November letter; dated 6 December]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Dear Minister:

I have familiarized myself thoroughly with your letter of 20 November 1995 and agree that equal relations between our countries should develop on the basis of recognition of democratic values, observance of human rights, and respect for the principles of the law-governed state, all of which have been included in the signed Slovak-Hungarian treaty. This establishes prerequisites for the realization of our common interest in integration into European and euro-atlantic economic and security structures and for stability in the region.

Proceeding from the above principles, the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] approved, by a clear majority of votes, the law on the state language of the Slovak Republic (not a law on the protection of the Slovak language), whereby it realized the generally accepted and incontestable principle of each law-governed state to establish conditions for securing language communication among all of its citizens. As is sufficiently known to you, the approval of such a law, which has no bearing on the use of the ethnic minorities' languages, is exclusively an internal matter of the [Slovak] state. Moreover, the protection of all ethnic minorities in the Slovak Republic is guaranteed in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and in another more than 30 legislative norms that are being properly applied, and will continue to be applied, in everyday life.

The law on the state language is in full conformity with the international commitments of the Slovak Republic, including commitments included in the signed Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty. In keeping with its earlier promise, even before the approval of this law, the Slovak Republic consulted on its contents not only at the level of the prime ministers of the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic, but also with Council of Europe experts, who confirmed the justification of its approval. The Slovak Republic holds this position in great esteem and appreciates the contribution of Council

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of Europe experts to the preparation of the draft. This appreciation is also documented by the fact that some of their recommendations had been considered in the draft. On the basis of these facts, I regard the diction of your proposal, which incorrectly defines this matter as though a dispute between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic were to be solved, as inadequate and the proposal to jointly submit the language law to Council of Europe experts for assessment as overtaken by developments and not topical. The Slovak Republic considers the endeavor of the Hungarian side to internationalize this issue to be counterproductive. Moreover, this endeavor aggravates the conditions for the ratification of the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic in the NRSR.

I am convinced that this proposal and other steps undertaken by the Hungarian side to date in connection with the approval of the law on the state language of the Slovak Republic are not in conformity with our joint efforts, which should be aimed at improving our bilateral relations and attaining our common objectives and interests.

Dear minister, I can assure you that the Slovak Republic has an extraordinary and sincere interest in the development of good-neighborly relations and friendly cooperation with the Hungarian Republic. In this context, I would like to remind you of the Slovak Government's request that a document be worked out on the status of the Slovak minority in Hungary from the viewpoint of the Framework Agreement of the Council of Europe on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities, as the Slovak Government has done with regard to the status of people belonging to the Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia. This document has been handed over to the Hungarian Government. I am confident that you will use your authority, also as acting chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and will become personally involved, in the spirit of the signed basic treaty, for this document also to contain specific measures toward halting the progressing assimilation of the Slovak minority in Hungary and toward its revitalization.

I am convinced that the speedy drafting and publication of this document will also be appreciated by the general secretary of the Council of Europe and by representatives of other important international organizations. This step will undoubtedly also have a not negligible positive influence on the atmosphere for the development of partnership cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic.

With cordial greetings,

Juraj Schenk

6 December 1995

Talks on Promoting Cooperation With Yugoslavia

LD1312180695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1758 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, Dec. 13 (TANJUG)—Deputy Yugoslav Foreign Minister Radoslav Bulajic conferred in Prague on Wednesday with Slovak Vice-Premier Jozef Kalman on the renewal and development of bilateral cooperation.

It was confirmed during the talks that Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar would visit Yugoslavia in late January, at the invitation of Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic.

Bulajic, who is on a two-day visit to Slovakia since Tuesday, conferred on Wednesday also with Slovak Chamber of Commerce President Petr Mihok on economic agreements which should be signed by the two governments during Meciar's forthcoming visit to Belgrade.

Bulajic also discussed concrete modalities and possibilities for renewing economic cooperation with Secretary of State with the Slovak Economic Ministry Pavel Hrma.

During the day, Bulajic is also to confer with Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, and, later today, with Yugoslav businessmen who live and work in Slovakia.

Minister on High Court Ruling, Bond Issue

AU1412085895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 7 and 8 December, on pages 1 and 2 in both instances, publishes a 1,500-word interview with Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, by Alica Durianova. The interview, the place and date of which are not given, deals with the recent decision of the Supreme Court that declared the Finance Ministry's decision to withdraw the license of PSIS, one of the most successful Slovak investment funds, unlawful, and with some aspects of the 1996 state budget.

The first installment of the interview is published under the headline "Sergej Kozlik: There Will Surely Be Some Internal Lesson, but Jozef Magula Will Keep His Post." Asked how the Finance Ministry would react to the decision of the Supreme Court to restore the PSIS's permit to operate, Kozlik says: "It is a decision of the Supreme Court. It was, and continues to be, our duty to supervise the capital market. We started performing this activity at a time when the laws were not always quite

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unequivocal. I can have certain internal reservations about some Supreme Court verdicts, but I have to accept them. The laws governing this sphere have improved in the meantime. We will continue to carry out supervision and, should we consider the conduct of some investment funds incorrect, we are going to step in. I think that even the funds themselves have realized to some extent that it is necessary to act correctly. There were certain findings and whether or not we were able to substantiate these findings sufficiently from the legal viewpoint has now been assessed by the Supreme Court. I am sure that, in the future, we will be able to formulate our objections more precisely. It goes without saying that, following the Supreme Court verdict, we will have to take certain steps, which I would not want to specify right now. I am thinking of measures in relation to the forced administrator, Harvardska Investicna Spolocnost [Harvard Investment Company], as well as measures in relation to PSIS."

Asked whether he could confirm speculations about the imminent dismissal of Jozef Magula, state secretary at the Ministry of Finance responsible for supervising the capital market, Kozlik says: "No, I cannot confirm these reports. Look, only those who do nothing make no mistakes. We will, of course, assess the Supreme Court verdicts as well as the Finance Ministry's decisions. In other words, some internal lesson will surely be drawn, but I do not think any personnel changes ought to arise from this."

In the first installment of the interview, Kozlik also rejects the investment funds' demand that the National Property Fund issue to citizens 10 bonds with a nominal value of 1,000 korunas [Sk] each, instead of one Sk10,000 bond, as planned by the Ministry of Finance. As the interviewer points out, this modification would allow investment funds to reclaim from citizens the Sk1,000 that many funds had advanced to citizens for their registration for the (meanwhile canceled) second wave of coupon privatization. Kozlik argues that this would make the "technical process" of issuing the bonds "10 times more demanding." As Kozlik says, "We opted for one Sk10,000 bond not because we were preparing some attack on investment funds behind the scenes, but because this is the most acceptable solution from the viewpoint of administrative demands."

The second installment of the interview is published under the headline "How the State Will Help Banks (Get Rid of Bad Loans) and Citizens (Toward Lower Interest Rates)." Kozlik is first asked about the impact of a proposed law on reserves, which should allow banks to include irrecoverable credits in their costs. The finance minister estimates that, in 1996, the "regime of creation of reserves and allowances for overdue credits" will cost approximately Sk2.7 billion and, in the subsequent three years, about Sk2 billion annually. According to Kozlik, the highest percentage of bad loans that banks will be allowed to write off will be 60 percent, but "banks that will submit projects that are approved by the National Bank of Slovakia and the Ministry of Finance can receive a permit for the creation of reserves for up to 80 percent."

The last question concerns the amendment to the banking law that the Slovak Cabinet approved on 5 December, which will establish the legal foundations for mortgage loans. Durianova points out that the Czech Government subsidizes mortgage loans with 4 percent, which facilitates middle classes' access to these loans, and asks Kozlik whether the Slovak Government, too, will help citizens toward lower interest rates. Kozlik replies that the government will set aside Sk1 billion for "support of housing construction" next year, but adds that the "mechanism of distributing and allocating this sum" has not yet been determined. The possibility mentioned by Durianova is one of the alternatives being considered, Kozlik says.

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Budapest Ready To Help in Balkan Reconstruction

AU1312183395 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Dec 95 p 10

[Interview with Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, Foreign Ministry political state secretary, by Miklos Ujvari; place and date not given: "Budapest Helps To Repatriate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary will participate in the reconstruction, which will give some compensation for the embargo losses, Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, political state secretary at the Foreign Ministry, told MAGYAR HIRLAP.

[Ujvari] What does the day of signing the Paris peace accord mean for Hungary?

[Szent-Ivanyi] This is a very important date because the war which was started four years ago in the neighboring south Slav region will be ended. The peace is a result of a compromise, it has no winners or losers, and for this reason I can see a chance for it to ring a lasting solution. Hungarian diplomacy hopes that the long and difficult process of reconstruction, the return of refugees, and reconciliataion can be started.

[Ujvari] What justifies Hungary's participation in implementing peace?

[Szent-Ivanyi] The sanctions against Belgrade and the refugee issue, including also the issue of the Hungarians living in the region, have gravely affected Hungary. The transit [of troops] and offering a basis for NATO are necessary contributions to the settlement. The issue of the Hungarian technical units created more debate but, in my view, this has also been resolved satisfactorily. It was a correct decision that we will participate with noncombatant units in the settlement; our technical units cannot be seen as enemy forces by anyone, their activities serve the return of normal civilian life.

[Ujvari] Hungary accepted the south Slav refugees but they are not enthusiastic about returning home, even now, when peace is being concluded. What will happen to them?

[Szent-Ivanyi] Refugees staying in Hungary have to decide now if they wish to return home. In my view, returning home will be the sensible and satisfactory decision for them. This also applies to the Bosnians and the eastern Slavonia and Baranja Hungarians. We are now trying to find out which way we can help them restart life in their homeland.

[Ujvari] Can Budapest expect compensation for the embargo losses?

[Szent-Ivanyi] The Hungarian Government cannot expect direct and full compensation for the losses that amount to some $2 billion. However, the weekend London conference decided that the countries which suffered direct losses should be given special attention in the reconstruction. A conference will soon be held on this issue in Brussels where we will find out in which way the international funds set up for this purpose can be used.

[Ujvari] The former Yugoslavia has split up into five states. Will we have five ambassadors in the region?

[Szent-Ivanyi] We are not that well off. A government decision states that a Hungarian embassy is to be set up in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. It would also be in our interest to open a representation in Sarajevo but this would be a serious financial burden; therefore, it cannot yet be promised. On a lower level, we maintained diplomatic relations with Belgrade even during the sanctions and an ambassador can again represent Hungary in Yugoslavia even within weeks after the peace is concluded in Paris.

South Tyrol Proposed as Romanian Ethnic Model

96BA0056A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 2 Nov 95 p 2

[Open letters of Bishop Laszlo Tokes, honorary president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, to Presidents Ion Iliescu of Romania and Arpad Goncz of Hungary]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Honorable Ion Iliescu, president of Romania, Bucharest

The Honorable Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic of Hungary, Budapest

Dear Mr. President:

When Prime Ministers Gyula Horn and Nicolae Vacaroiu met in Warsaw early October, during the conference of Central European heads of government, they mutually established that talks on a basic treaty between the two countries were stalled at present, and therefore another meeting to iron out differences would be inopportune in the near future. But they did discuss the possibility of setting up a high-level forum of experts to consider three Romanian documents regarding a historical reconciliation between Romania and Hungary.

In view of the forthcoming reconciliation talks, and led by a desire to have also Romania's ethnic Hungarian community participate constructively in settling Romanian-Hungarian relations and in bringing about a historical reconciliation, I hereby respectfully request that—in the interest of good progress in the talks about

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to begin soon—you use your outstanding influence to support and help adopt my following alternative reconciliation proposal:

The Italian-Austrian, or South Tyrolean, reconciliation model, rather than the French-German one, should be recognized as the appropriate model and example to be followed, for the following reasons:

a) The French-German model is not as relevant to Romanian-Hungarian relations as the South Tyrolean one is. The agreement on Alsace-Lorraine was intended to settle international relations burdened by traditional German-French revanchism. In contrast, what is at stake in Hungarian-Romanian relations is not so much the settlement of relations between the two countries, but rather the settlement of the ethnic Hungarian community's status in Romania; in the same way as in the case of South Tyrol's ethnic Germans.

b) The main obstacle to Romanian-Hungarian historical reconciliation must be sought in relations between Romanians and Romania's ethnic Hungarians. Consequently, actual reconciliation must be achieved not between two countries, but between Romanians and the ethnic Hungarians here in Romania.

In accordance with all this, the only road to, precondition of and opportunity for Romanian-Hungarian historical reconciliation is the guarantee of autonomous status, and of individual and collective human rights, for Romania's ethnic Hungarian community, on the time-honored model of the Italian-Austrian agreement. If the two sides follow this road in a truly sincere desire for a solution and a satisfying settlement, this would of course remove also the obstacles to concluding a basic treaty between the two countries. Such a treaty is desirable from a legal point of view, to guarantee a final and real solution.

There is also another compelling reason that leads me to present my alternative reconciliation proposal. The ethnic Hungarians are a thousand-year-old, historical, state-forming political collective of Romania and Transylvania, respectively. They, together with Romania's ethnic Germans, have contributed decisively and to a large extent toward the political, cultural, economic and civilizational development of our country and region. Therefore, Romania's ethnic Hungarians do not wish to share by any means the sad fate of Alsace's ethnic Germans. It is through social integration, rather than assimilation, that we want to become useful citizens and a constructive ethnic collective of Romania, of the country whose fortunes we too have helped to change in 1989.

Mr. President, already at its Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] Congress in 1991, and again at its Third Congress in January 1993, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR in Romanian, RMDSZ in Hungarian] advocated the convening of a bilateral Romanian-Hungarian roundtable conference that, on the basis of an agreement, would "finally settle our common affairs" and at the same time "could be a solid foundation for a Romanian-Hungarian treaty and become the definitive forum for universal Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation." Together with the UDMR, also our Hungarian Christian churches are working indefatigably for such reconciliation and bilateral international agreement.

I respectfully request, Mr. President, that you seriously consider my alternative reconciliation proposal that takes both Romanian and Hungarian interests into account. Avoiding the dead end of seeming reconciliation, and of efforts to compensate for failure to agree on a basic treaty, my proposal offers a realistic opportunity for real historical reconciliation.

Very truly yours,

Bishop Laszlo Tokes, Honorary President of the UDMR

31 October 1995

Coalition, Opposition Prospects Examined

AU1312141395 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 12 Dec 95 p 8

[Article by Janos Barany: "There Will Really Be No Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that the opposition card game of Old Maid is played by very shrewd strategists. The situation is different in the open "political bridge" in which the coalition partners keep making mistakes one after the other. The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] wants to get rid of its own liberal wing while relying on the doctrinaire liberal Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]. The SZDSZ is weakening the moderate center-right forces by presenting Torgyan as an alternative through the media. Of course, this causes a considerable loss in support for the MSZP as well, because Gyula Horn's supporters are precisely those who, given their hopeless situation, are prone to demagogy.

Ever since the [Democratic] Charta set the course for the MSZP, and the media is now doing the same to Torgyan, it has become clear that the only chance of the SZDSZ—a party that is unable to sell itself and is always pushing someone else in front of it—is a situation in which, in addition to all the existing government alternatives,

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an alternative emerges that is capable of siphoning a considerable number of votes away from the other parliamentary parties. This could lead to the stabilization of the balance between the aforementioned forces and the SZDSZ, and in the case of the MSZP, this balance would turn in favor of the SZDSZ.

The special technique in editing Gyula Horn's television statements and speeches and Gyorgy Schamschula's presentation as a star in the Hungarian media, a person who has been holding dissertations about the collapse of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] for the past 18 months and has lately begun referring to the late Jozsef Antal, is one element of all this, albeit a peripheral one. The interesting thing is that, if the late prime minister were still alive, Schamschula would be in the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] for quite some time now.

If the question arising in 1998 is, say, Sandor Nagy, or Mrs. Kosa, or perhaps Miklos Nemeth or Torgyan, then a moderate center right weakened by a strong alternative would only play the role of an extra in a new MSZP-SZDSZ coalition. Therefore, the apolitical arguments of those fearing that the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] might "disappear" are far from the idea of three-party alliance that political logic dictates. Similarly stupid is the claim that this is the way the MDF leaders want to preserve their ministerial and state secretarial positions. With or without Torgyan, the MDF can definitely count on a number of votes similar to the one they received in May 1994. This is probably so even if everyone, from the top KDNP to Torgyan, will try to win over the MDF supporters. In connection with the three-party alliance meant to preserve the leaders, all I can say is that such a three-party alliance was already emerging as a possible alternative before the elections in 1994. I quote my own words: "...the withdrawals will have to be coordinated between three parties, namely, the MDF, the KDNP, and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]. In places where SZDSZ and MSZP candidates continue to compete, individual runners have no chance against the MDF-KDNP-FIDESZ candidate." And perhaps I do not have to prove that I was not at all interested in saving ministers or degrading the KDNP into a satellite party. Even without a thorough knowledge of the theory of relativity, it is obvious that, if the three-party alliance fails to emerge, the winner of the struggle for the MDF supporters will be the MSZP and the SZDSZ, and not the KDNP or Torgyan for that matter.

Besides, it is an illusion that, in the meantime, the MDF can lose a considerable number of votes, because the MDF group in parliament is made up of experienced politicians of whom 12 percent of the voters actually voted for. With the slow upgrading of the Antall policy, Schamschula or Peter Balaton will not be the ones to benefit from this; instead, all those who did much better in the previous cycle than the current government will benefit from this. However, as long as there are five parties competing against each other on the right, as opposed to three parties competing against each other on the left, a right-wing party does not have a real chance to succeed! As for the popularity list, the MDF cannot advance primarily because of its own internal struggle, while the KDNP cannot advance because the basis of MDF supporters is much more stable than many people believed it is.

Obviously, if the KDNP is open to all the three opposition parties in parliament, it is trying in vain to get voters away from the FKGP because, viewed from that side, a radical Christian party is a nonsense. Thus, a collapsed MDF or an MSZP quickly losing its popularity, or the two together, can lead to the strengthening of the KDNP. There is almost no chance at all for the former, and there is only very little chance for the latter, because those who are expecting miracles have long been increasing the number of Torgyan supporters. Those who got, and get disappointed in the MSZP for other reasons, will primarily support the SZDSZ or the MDF, after automatically comparing the two governments. The FIDESZ, which has been so much attacked from the right, is perhaps the only party that can weaken the only supporters of the MSZP-SZDSZ.

All this means that the KDNP alone cannot be an alternative to the three-party alliance, because it is simply incapable of covering the moderate right wing; for the same reasons, the MDF and the FIDESZ are not alternatives either. However, there is no three-party alliance, and it is possible that there will be no such alliance in the wake of the party struggles based on identical number of voters. With its decision on 11 November, the KDNP drifted the MDF (and also the FIDESZ to a certain extent) into a interparty rivalry which, most probably, neither of them will be able to win. At the same time, lacking a realistic alternative, the SZDSZ-MSZP voters stay where they are with the slogan "there is nothing else."

The moderate center right will either give up the idea of running in the 1998 election with the hope of success and, instead, concentrates on the next elections in the year 2002, or the MDF will try to provide an alternative by closely cooperating with the FIDESZ and, within the possibilities, with the KDNP, in the line of Antall's policy! The basic conditions for this are the following: a uniform leadership, an end to inward politics, namely, an end of the permanent

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election campaign to convince the party members after the national meeting, and stressing the fact that the party policy focuses on creating a broad national-oriented middle class. This also means the maximum consideration of the frameworks of a constitutional state (that is also the condition of joining Europe), the consistent representation of the interests of ethnic Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders, and the creation of a Western European-style social market economy. In other words, the MDF will have to continue to actually implement the radical Antall strategy based on long-term national interests.

Of course, this policy contradicts not only the South American model of society in which millions of impoverished people are facing a few thousand ultra rich people, but also Torgyan's simplified society image, as well as the subsequent pseudoradical solutions and social demagogy. Thus, the MDF can become an alternative to the coalition if it clearly and firmly opposes the big capitalists singing the International, the representatives of doctrinaire liberalism, and Torgyan, who is radically national only in his rhetoric. In this inevitable double confrontation, the FIDESZ will probably remain a partner. As for the KDNP, which is also interested in social mobility, with time, its own voters will hopefully convince this party that adhering to a mutually acceptable program is much more important than any coalition ability.

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Bosnian Prime Minister Interviewed on Peace Accord

MS1412132295 London BBC Television Network in English 1300 GMT 14 Dec 95

[Interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by announcer Justin Webb; Silajdzic in Sarajevo, Webb in the studio; from the "One O'Clock" newscast — live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Webb] Mr. Silajdzic, how confident are you that the war is now over for good?

[Silajdzic] It depends on the international community and the implementation of this. The international community has committed itself today to preserve the law and order because this all began by violating the Bosnian borders, the international Bosnian borders. Now there is another crisis here that the international community has decided today to resolve, and that's the moral crisis, the crisis of principles. We have had 200,000 thousand people die, 17 thousand of them children. The international community has said today in Paris that it will not only stop it, but not to allow it to repeat itself ever again, so it is not only peace in Bosnia that is at stake in this implementation, it is also the credibility of the international community, all of it, and the peace of the world.

[Webb] In that case, Mr. Silajdzic, when people talk of the NATO force staying for about a year, they might be disappointed, might they? They might have to stay much longer?

[Silajdzic] Not at all, I think that one year is enough, if we have peace. If we want to have peace we will have it in one year, if not, then two years won't help either, so one year is a lot of time in Bosnia, we live [words indistinct] in past history. But as I said, the most important thing is the prompt arrival of the forces and the prompt and the (?firm) position of the implementation of this agreement.

[Webb] What do you say now to the Serbs who live around Sarajevo and say that their position now is desperate? Should they stay?

[Silajdzic] Well, I would ask those Serbs around Sarajevo where are their neighbors, that form the majority of people there, where are their neighbors?

[Webb] Mr. Silajdzic, thank you very much for talking to us today.

Bildt Interviewed on End of War, Peace Accord

MS1412105995 London BBC Television Network in English 0700 GMT 14 Dec 95

[Interview with Bosnian Peace coordinator Carl Bildt by announcer Justin Webb; Bildt in Paris; Webb in the studio; from "The Breakfast News" program — live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Webb] Mr. Bildt, good morning.

[Bildt] Good morning.

[Webb] We don't often talk about reasons to be optimistic about Bosnia, so let's start there. What are the reasons to be optimistic; what are the factors that are on your side in this huge task?

[Bildt] I think the reason to be optimistic is that the war has ended, and that all of the peoples down in Bosnia are tired of the war. That's the reason to be optimistic. Then you also have to be a realist; it is an enormous task that is ahead of us, to go from what is the absence of war, which we have at the moment, to something that is a real and genuine peace, and there are as you hinted various obstacles on that process, but that's what we are going to try to achieve.

[Webb] Let us look at just one or two of those obstacles. Obstacle number one, I suppose, for so many people in Bosnia who have had to leave their homes: Are you seriously suggesting that within a reasonable time frame you are going to be able to say to people it is safe now to go back to your home, perhaps a Muslim going back to an area that is now held by the Serbs, or vice versa?

[Bildt] We must start to create the conditions for that, then it is up to the peoples themselves, be they refugees, displaced persons in Western Europe or inside Bosnia, inside the region, to decide when they feel that it is safe to start moving back home. But I hope that we will have the start of that process during the spring, when snow starts melting away, and that we will see substantial numbers by the time that we have the elections within 6 to 9 months. It is going to take time.

[Webb] What are you going to be able to do though to persuade them that it is safe?

[Bildt] I think a safe and secure environment is important, although the implementation force does... [changes thought] ...hasn't that as one of its immediate tasks. It is going to cast a shadow of security over Bosnia. We must also move forward with the international police task force that we are now intending to set up with the help United Nations, and then the entire economic reconstruction program, the political reconciliation that is

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going to be exceedingly difficult, but also very important in order to achieve these objectives.

[Webb] Economic reconstruction of course means money. Is the money there, have you got the pledges of money that could make a real difference in the short term?

[Bildt] Well, we have got pledges of money for very substantial sums. I would like to have pledges of even greater sums; I think those will come when we have got an overall program for what we intend to do in Bosnia during the course of the next three or four years, and we need a proper macroeconomic framework, because it is not just the question of pouring money into the place. It is also question having the right economic policies in the place to make the money work in the way that we intend.

[Webb] What's going to happen about the people we have been accused of being war criminals? There is some confusion, isn't there? They plainly are not going to take part in politics, they are not going to be dealing with you as politicians, but they are still going to be there, and nobody is going to chase them?

[Bildt] Well eventually, I — eventually — I think they will be chased down, and eventually I think they will be brought to The Hague and be brought to trial.

[Webb] Really, so you think that Messrs. Karadzic and Mladic will eventually have to leave the place that they think they are safe in at the moment, in the Serb controlled part of Bosnia, and go to The Hague?

[Bildt] Yes, in the one way or the other — at one time or the other I think that is going to happen, and I think it is important that it happens this way.

[Webb] Who do you think will find them and take them there, then?

[Bildt] Well, let's see, first the obligation is of course there on the political authorities of the respective countries. There is an obligation on the part of President Milosevic of Yugoslavia of Serbia to do whatever he can, there is an obligation on the part of the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to do, and it applies not only to Karadzic and Mladic, it applies to others as well. For example, there are those that are indicted on Bosnian-Croat side that it applies to equally. So it is going to be difficult, yes, but I am quite convinced it will happen.

[Webb] Mr. Bildt, thank you very much for talking to us this morning.

[Bildt] Thank you.

Croat Official Comments on Acceptance of Accord

LD1412005095 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina left for Paris after the deputies of the Constitutional Assembly yesterday supported the Dayton agreement with a majority of votes, and decided on the signing of the agreement in Paris. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly session itself heard a heated debate. Ivan Bender, the speaker of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, who is our guest tonight, will tell us something more about it. He is in the studio at Siroki Brijeg. Good evening.

[Bender] Greetings to all Croatian TV viewers.

[Announcer] Well, how was the decision arrived at?

[Bender] We should repeat once again that the Dayton agreement was accepted by a majority of votes of the deputies present. Automatically it may be concluded that there were different opinions, different proposals, but in the end we achieved what had to be achieved, views were reconciled, and we appointed and authorized the delegation that will sign the agreement tomorrow in Paris. We also ordered the delegation to ensure, in the event of any changes, the inclusion of the whole of Bosnian Posavina in the composition of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to find such constitutional solutions that would guarantee them — and I am talking about Croats in this case — equality, sovereignty and constituent rights [konstitutivnost] throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Announcer] Were any other decisions and laws adopted?

[Bender] We also debated and decided on the adoption of certain draft laws: the draft law on the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the draft law on the structure and responsibilities of the ministries of the government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. A commission was formed to adjust the Constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation to the Dayton agreement. Laws on defense, on internal affairs, and the law on the Central Bank are in the process of being worked out. All this remains to be coordinated and debated. We will not allow the adoption of any laws without the Croatian deputies giving their opinions.

[Announcer] Mr. Bender, thank you for this conversation.

[Bender] Thank you.

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Bosnian Serbs' Krajisnik on Paris Peace Accord

LD1312173195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1635 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 13 Dec (SRNA) — Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic People's Assembly, today said that he expects the controversial issues from the Dayton agreement — the most important one being the status of Serb Sarajevo — to be solved at the conference in Paris.

In a statement for SRNA and Serb Radio-Television, Krajisnik stressed that the implementation of the peace agreement, as currently envisaged for Serb Sarajevo, is impossible, and that no one has the right to forcibly impose Muslim authority on the Serbs in this city.

"Serbs should stay in Serb Sarajevo because IFOR [Implementation Force] does not have the mandate to impose control by the Croat-Muslim federation by force, and the Muslims cannot impose it by their own force," the Serb Republic parliament speaker said. He added that this does not mean that the Serbs are threatening to use force, but are describing the actual state of affairs.

Krajisnik stressed that special written guarantees for the Serbs in Serb Sarajevo are expected to be made at the Paris conference. He noted that the Dayton agreement and the peace forces' mandate leave room for the implementation of the peace agreement in Sarajevo to be postponed by one year.

"Whether the outcome of the Paris conference is positive or negative, the Serb Republic People's Assembly will adopt relevant decisions, respecting the wish expressed by the citizens of Serb Sarajevo and the republic's strategic interests," Krajisnik said.

He confirmed that Serb Republic Vice President Nikola Koljevic and Gaso Mijanovic, president of the Serb Republic's Constitutional Court, have gone to Paris, but said that he does not know whether they have a mandate to sign the peace agreement.

In conclusion, in a message to the citizens of Serb Sarajevo, the Serb Republic People's Assembly speaker again says that there is no reason for panic and no need for the people to take individual action, because the issue of them remaining in Serb Sarajevo will be solved globally.

Seeking 'Last Minute Changes'

AU1312183295 Paris AFP in English 1805 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Dec 13 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb leaders unhappy over certain aspects of the Dayton peace agreement called Wednesday for last minute changes to the accord before the official signing ceremony in Paris Thursday.

"Our delegation (in Paris) expects certain issues for Dayton to be worked out in detail and improved in case they cannot be changed," Bosnian Serb "vice president" Nikola Koljevic told official Pale radio Wednesday. [passage omitted]

Another senior Bosnian Serb figure, Momcilo Krajisnik, told Pale radio: "We expected there would be an improvement in London. However, that did not take place and the last chance now is Paris."

Krajisnik warned that the Serb authorities have problems "because 100,000 people should then leave the territories to be given to the (Moslem-Croat) federation."

Aid officials estimate that some 40,000 Serbs live in the affected parts of the city and have warned that all could move once the accord comes into effect. Many Serbs have said they will leave after torching their homes and businesses. [passage omitted]

"Sarajevo is an almost unbridgeable problem. We expect the Paris conference to bring a just solution for Sarajevo," Krajisnik added.

The western diplomat said it was possible that "some announcement" will be made in Paris concerning the transfer of authority in the Serb-held Sarajevo areas. "It will not change or alter the Dayton agreement. It will be a solution worked out between the Serbs and the Bosnian government."

Krajisnik Rejects 'Multinational Reconciliation'

AU1312190595 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Dec 95

[Statement by Pale Serb assembly chairman Momcilo Krajisnik in the Rajlovac suburb of Sarajevo on 12 December — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] My wish was to take part in this democratic referendum in Serb Sarajevo, and thus make a contribution toward making the voice of the Serb people heard, as well as at the response to the [words indistinct] of the international community and the unjust solution that was, in a way, [word indistinct] in Dayton.

The people are right to do everything that they are doing, and they will surely show the world how justified the warnings were that solutions like this cannot be imposed on the people, and that the Serb people in Sarajevo have their roots and want to stay here, that they do not want any bargains, any rotten compromises, and that they do not want to accept Muslim authority.

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[Words indistinct] I do not believe that Europe has forgotten about democracy and the right of a people to self-determination. If the decision of the people is accepted, a great contribution will be made to the implementation of the agreement; it will be made easier. I think that it would be a great mistake not to accept it, and those who want to implement this kind of solution by force should be aware of the kind of adventure that they would be getting into.

At any rate, we want peace and equality of the peoples to be established in this area, but the right of the people — the people who clearly stated in 1992 that they did not accept an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, and said so in several referenda, as well as pointing this out at the recent public gatherings [passage indistinct] cannot be ignored.

There have been positive indications that reality must be acknowledged. The most dangerous and utopian thing is to (?observe) a solution that has not come to life in many areas — a solution involving multinational reconciliation — so suddenly and powerfully after a difficult civil war; if we are not realistic, we cannot reach a realistic solution. I hope that our people are determined, as they have shown many times, to stay here, not to accept any Muslim authority, and, most important, to distinguish between a genuine intention and an intention that does not have a [word indistinct], or, better said, a realistic basis.

It is not possible to [word indistinct] that the Serbs have the right to stay in Sarajevo if the Dayton agreement is the end of the entire process, because that would be (?cynical). The Serbs will not accept Muslim authority; [passage indistinct] from these areas.

Bosnian Army Prepared for Either Peace or War

LD1312220595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Dayton agreements and their implementation were one of the main topics at a regular meeting today of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's General Staff, attended by the commanders of all corps and by the chiefs of the general staffs' departments.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will fully respect the set deadlines and will be ready for the agreed peace. However, it will also be ready for the continuation of war. This was concluded at the meeting, at which full attention was paid to the federal set-up of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which will — together with the Croat Defense Council — soon form a united armed force.

The new status of our fighters is particularly interesting. In training and material conditions, the fighters will gradually acquire the standards of modern armies.

Presidency Raises Military, Disabled Salaries

AU1212205095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 DEc 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held a session today, presided over by Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic.

At today's session, the Presidency discussed the standard of living of the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, on the proposal of our country's government, issued a legally binding decree on amendments to the law on paying members of the Armed Forces. According to this law, the monthly salary for time spent in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to be 400 German marks [DM]. [number indistinct] is given to the war disabled with over 60 percent disability. Families of fallen members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and war disabled with 100 percent disability are to receive (?DM600) from the day they were engaged by the Armed Forces until the end of the war. These sums will not be paid in cash, but in securities [vrijednosni papir]. Special regulations will be issued on this issue. Members of the Armed Forces will receive a single payment in aid, monthly food packages, personal hygiene items, cigarettes, and utilities costs, and housing costs will be partly or fully subsidized for them, in accordance with the capabilities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the basis of special decisions.

On the day that this decree comes into force, the previous regulations on payment for members of the Armed Forces and other users ceases to be valid.

The Presidency also discussed other issues within its jurisdiction.

Ganic Clarifies Decision

AU1312201295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been commenting on yesterday's decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the new method of paying members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Several months after the war began, in November 1992, during my visit to the 1st Corps Command, I put forward the idea that the soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was in the making also be paid with stocks, that is, securities. Almost three years were needed to put this idea into practice — and it was done yesterday through a decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina — as it proved rather complicated to determine and separate the ownership rights, especially for so called socially owned property that was a specific feature of our self-managing socialism.

After a comprehensive analysis by experts in government and non- governmental organizations, we came up with this legally binding decision that the salary for every month spent in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to be 400 German marks [DM]. The war disabled with over 60 percent disability will receive DM500, while families of fighters who have been killed will receive DM600 from the day they were engaged by the armed forces until the end of the war. All these sums will be paid out in securities. The recipients will be able to use them to purchase apartments or stocks in companies, or sell them to commercial banks, start private businesses, and so forth.

In this way all those who have stayed here and directly defended Bosnia will be rewarded in a material way, said Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sacirbegovic Opposes Amnesty for Karadzic, Mladic

LD1312222195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic today described the proposals of certain international institutions that the indictments for war crimes against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic be frozen as very worrying. He noted that the two accused are directly responsible for the greatest crimes against mankind.

This includes criminal responsibility for the killing of more than 200,000 people, including 17,000 children, the expulsion of some 2 million people from their homes, and for thousands of rapes, Minister Sacirbegovic said. He stressed that in order for peace to be achieved in Bosnia-Hezcegovina, it is necessary that Karadzic and Mladic be brought to justice. He reiterated that no country has the legal right to grant amnesty to those accused of war crimes. Minister Sacirbegovic noted that the conclusions of the London peace conference for the implementation of the Dayton agreement and the latest ministerial conference of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe were that all countries must fully cooperate with the Hague war crimes tribunal.

Sacirbegovic Opposes FRY as SFRY Successor

AU1312193595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic has stated that the stand taken by the representatives of some member countries in the UN Security Council that the so-called Yugoslavia should be the successor of the former SFRY in international institutions is alarmingly negative.

We want to stress our views on the factors that are important for the international community's joint goals concerning peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkan region. We particularly want to (?stress) the importance of continuing to exert pressure on the Belgrade regime to improve national and human rights in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak, to comply with the work and demands of the international war tribunal in The Hague, and to support the peace process by extraditing war criminals, such as Karadzic and Mladic, Minister Sacirbegovic said.

The minister takes the view that Serbia and Montenegro should not be offered membership in the United Nations, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and World Bank, the IMF, and other international institutions until they meet these conditions. [passage omitted]

'Considerable' State Media Subsidies Examined

AU1212175495 Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 30 Nov 95 p 15

[Unattributed report: "Aid Guaranteed Only to Those Who Write Favorably About the Premier and Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A report is circulating throughout the capital of the Bosnian media empire: Next year OSLOBODJENJE, VECERNJE NOVINE, SLOBODNA BOSNA, LJILJAN, and LASTAVICA can hope for considerable aid from the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These five newspapers have been chosen to promote "the government's truth" in a year that will be extremely difficult for the media, as much from the financial aspect as from the material-technological and communications aspect. And only the naive may think that when one gives away something, one does not expect to get anything in return.

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What criteria have been applied to select precisely these newspapers as state organs — even though most of them boast independence, and owing to such a logo-type [as published] deceit they are getting money, awards, materials, and other donations throughout the world — is hard to establish, because the responsible officials in the Ministry of Culture did not want to provide us with any more substantial data that would account for the discriminatory decision of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Regime-Run and Independent Journalism

The aide of the minister of culture, Srebren Dizdar, has explained to us that 70 radio and TV stations, as well as 210 newspapers in Bosnia-Herzegovina speak enough for the attitude of the state toward the media. And because of the devastated media infrastructure, the lack of newsprint and other necessary materials, some media houses have been receiving considerable subsidies from the state. These considerable subsidies have for the most part gone to OSLOBODJENJE, VECERNJE NOVINE, and some other newspapers (we shall limit ourselves only to newspapers).

However, a paradox is emerging, so typical of the omnipresent hypocrisy in Bosnian society. For instance, OSLOBODJENJE has won most of its awards by boasting of its independence from the state. Independence is indeed the principal criterion for awards and aid. The same method is used by VECERNJE NOVINE. Witnesses say that sometimes it was tasteless to watch how individuals from abroad blemished their colleagues in Bosnia, who did not give a damn for opinions of some international media factors which based their opinion on the media independence in Bosnia without ever coming to the place of event, that is, visiting the Bosnian media.

They were referred to as people of the regime, while those who were present in studios declared themselves the supreme critics of independence and professionalism in Bosnian journalism.

It is a public secret that OSLOBODJENJE and VECERNJE NOVINE have survived thanks to subsidies from the Bosnian state, so out of respect for that state they should not be selling the false image of a joint stock company. VECERNJE NOVINE, for instance, has received from the government in the course of the war 21,500,000 Bosnian dinars in subsidies (215,000 German marks), as well as a 100,000 German mark loan to be paid back over six months, while the first installment is due as late as in February next year.

Of course, we are not against obtaining that aid, but then one must say and acknowledge that, rather than to tell rubbish to the world about one's independent position. However, perhaps OSLOBODJENJE is balancing its independence by the fact that the state has never paid for copies which it has been receiving each day throughout the war, but regardless of that, one cannot speak about a market-based relationship between the state and OSLOBODJENJE.

Government Without Criteria

In contrast to VECERNJE NOVINE and OSLOBODJENJE, LJILJAN is not cultivating the image of independence, so the subsidies it has been getting from Karic's ministry have to be understood in that way — as aid given by the minister who is in position to help his friends. Whether this is a correct approach you should judge for yourself.

What is eye-catching is the fact that among the most important and influential media aid is allotted for the greatest part to those that can be called in a simplified way Silajdzic's media family. We have nothing against that either, if the government will officially determine its criteria for subsidies and insist that one of the basic requirements is uncritical loyalty of a newspaper to the premier and government officials.

However, what makes the entire matter additionally problematic is that the relationship between the state and the media is not still legally regulated, so that the majority of laws from the previous system are still effective. According to the Ministry of Culture, those laws regulate only the legal aspect, while other dimensions of relations, such as, for instance, technical aid, are not regulated. Does that mean that aid is being administered under the counter?

"Most probably no, because money and other means are coming in through the Finance Ministry, following the government's proposal, that is, that of Culture Ministry. In this relationship many elements are still unclear. Within the Law on Information the government should make clear that the media receiving generous subsidies from it are state-run, as a matter of fact, and not to make the public believe that the state-run media are only BH PRESS and RTVBIH [Radio-Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina]. BH PRESS has cumulatively received considerably less funds than the aforementioned newspapers, which are officially considered to be joint-stock companies, that is, newspapers independent from the state. Those are all unclarities that require a clear legal formulation," Dizdar says.

Aid Based on Personal Affinities

Mr. Dizdar explains to us that before the war the socialist state system was subsidizing the state-run media for 92 percent of their means, while they earned themselves

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through marketing only 8 percent. However, now the situation is quite different, so that subsidies by the state are considered to be a measure without which it is hard to survive on the market. It is interesting that state officials consider OSLOBODJENJE and VECERNJE NOVINE as state-run newspapers, so they view them on the same level as the RTVBIH and BH PRESS. The problem is that OSLOBODJENJE and VECERNJE NOVINE do not consider themselves state-run. Mr. Dizdar further tells us about subsidies to the state-run and other media:

"The issue has to do with an amount of money that could possibly be apportioned as aid to those media houses, but that amount is very small in view of their needs," Dizdar says, adding that subsidies are given chiefly through the state budget. A definite attitude toward the independent newspapers has not been defined yet, because the relevant ministry is supposed to approve donations from elsewhere. One of few successful actions of aiding independent newspapers was when smaller quantities of newsprint were dealt out, or when a great number of copies of independent newspapers were redeemed and then sent out to other bodies.

"It has been concluded that there has been no particular financial support, and the majority of media houses have been receiving means from other sources. On the other hand, those whom we have not subsidized, we have not prevented from getting aid from elsewhere as well," Dizdar concludes, confirming our attitude that OSLOBODJENJE and VECERNJE NOVINE are treated by the state as its own newspapers, rather than as independent ones.

So, this is the view of relations between the state and the media in just one field, that of financial and any other sort of material aid. The state boasting that it has saved its democratic process throughout the war would have to protect the basic mechanisms of that democracy, and not to determine which media deserve its aid on the basis of personal affinities, uncritical eulogies, and similar things.

German Aid Provides New Electricity Lines for Sarajevo

AU1312194495 Paris AFP in English 1930 GMT 13 Dec 95

[Report by Edina Neretljak: "In Sarajevo, More Power to the People"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 13 (AFP) — Sarajevans will soon be able to enjoy more than the current 6 kilowatts of power per day per home thanks to an alternative power supply line financed mainly by Germany, the first to be under full Bosnian control.

Electricity in the capital was scarce throughout most of the war since the existing power lines go through the territory of the rebel Bosnian Serbs, who used the power as means of war, turning it on and off whenever they wanted to apply more pressure on the Bosnians.

One condition for the cease-fire that took effect October 12 was that the Serbs turn on the two power lines so that the city has at least some power.

The new line will give the city an extra 100 megawatts of electricity. The line goes completely through government-controlled territory, starting from a power plant in Jablanica in the south of the country and running across the Igman mountain to Sarajevo. It enters the city through a tunnel running under the tarmac of the UN-controlled Sarajevo airport.

The tunnel line was put into operation at the beginning of this year and worked for several months, but the amounts of electricity it gave was enough only for hospitals, bakeries, army barracks and post offices. Ordinary people had power only for couple of hours every fourth day at best, often late in the night.

Work on building a more powerful line started last spring. Many Bosnian men who were not drafted did their shift on Igman and Treskavica mountains, digging trenches and erecting pillars for the line.

With the establishment of the new line due to start working on December 20, residents should be able to bask in power without the tiring counting of watts or getting up at midnight for a hasty cleaning.

The Federal Republic of Germany donated 10 million marks, mainly in equipment, for the new line.

Thanking the German government for the aid, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic sent a letter to German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel inviting him to come to Sarajevo and personally inaugurate the line.

Silajdzic Thanks FRG

AU1312203695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has sent the following letter to German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel:

It is my pleasure to inform you that the project for an alternative electricity supply for the city of Sarajevo, a significant part of which has been donated by the Federal Republic of Germany, has been completed.

I am taking this opportunity to inform you that we plan to put into operation the underground power supply line for Sarajevo at 1200 on 20 December of this year.

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Your Excellency, I would like to thank the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and you personally for everything that you have done in the implementation of this project.

It would be our honor and pleasure if you could personally come to inaugurate the power line. In expectation of your visit to Sarajevo, I send you my special expressions of respect.

This was stated in a letter that Prime Minister Silajdzic has sent to German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.

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HKDU Leader Rejects 'Highly Unjust' Peace Accord

AU1412094195 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Dec 95 p 10

[Interview with Marko Veselica, president of the Croatian Christian Democratic Union, HKDU, and member of the Croatian parliament, by Slavica Lukic; place and date not given: "Dayton Peace — Paris Mutiny"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Lukic] You stated recently that the Dayton Agreement is a result of secret diplomacy. Can you explain?

[Veselica] Throughout history, the Croatian political elites have often passed decisions that cost us dearly, without consulting the people and the Sabor. [passage omitted]

We have witnessed how President Tudjman and Foreign Minister Mate Granic wanted to go to Paris without consulting the people and the Sabor, and to definitively sign the defeat for the Croats from Bosnian Posavina. For that reason, we demanded that a debate be opened in the Sabor and that a referendum be called on this issue. [passage omitted]

Investment in a New War

[Veselica] Your party and you, yourself, personally support the protests of the Bosnian Posavina residents. What is the ultimate objective of your efforts?

[Veselica] We do not want the Paris meeting to be held. It is a dead end for the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it will determine the fate of Croatia for the next 100 years. By finalizing the Dayton Agreement, approximately 90,000 soldiers of the Atlantic pact will arrive in Croatia, among which the Americans will have the strongest position. The United States is a great power that will, through its presence on this territory, prove its ranking, its organization, its lethal power, and its financial, military, and intelligence strength. It will have complete military and civilian authority in this territory. Nobody will be able to move. They will try to realize the Dayton peace at all costs, and carve into stone the unjust division of the territory drawn up there.

[Lukic] What alternative do you propose?

[Veselica] I propose an uprising of the people. Naturally, a legitimate political and not a physical uprising. The people must protest and prevent President Tudjman from going to Paris. The people must make him revoke his signature and open the debate about Dayton and, thus, mobilize the part of the U.S. public that thinks differently than Bill Clinton regarding the resolution of the crisis. Here, I refer primarily to the Republican Bob Dole and his circle. We must explain to them that Milosevic cannot be all that easily absolved from the responsibility for the war, and that the Dayton peace does not mean a stabilization of these territories, but merely an investment in a new war, which can grow into a conflict of Balkan and international dimensions.

Against Unjust Peace

[Lukic] Does the destruction of the Dayton peace also means rushing into a new war?

[Veselica] We are against the war, however, we are also against the unjust peace. The Versailles Treaty is an example of peace that led to an even bloodier war. Tito's Yugoslavia was the "salvaging formula" of the resolution of the Croatian-Serbian conflict, and one can see to what it has all amounted. The Dayton model, too, will not lead to the resolution of the war conflict. It is an illusion and a fiction of certain current protagonists in our domestic and international politics, who, in the name of a temporarily peace, are creating the preconditions for a new crime. It is highly unjust. Is it normal that the aggressor who started the war, killed 250,000 people, raped 50,000 women, killed 15,000 children, and inflicted $200 billion of war damages gets 20 percent more territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina than he has residents, and that he is given the Serb Republic, which is only a link in the further war that Serbia has started with the intention of expanding and purging Bosnia- Herzegovina of Croats and Bosniaks? [passage omitted]

Turkish Minister on Bosnia, Terrorism, Drug Routes

AU1312132795 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Dec 95 p 8

[Interview with Turkish Interior Minister Teoman Unusan by Ivanka Toma; place and date not given: "Drug Routes Go Through Croatia As Well"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Teoman Unusan, interior minister of the Republic of Turkey, has just visited the Republic of Croatia, where he met with his Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina counterparts to discuss the problem of around 25,000 refugees from western Bosnia who are currently being accommodated in the Kuplensko refugee camp. At the meeting the three officials agreed upon conditions of the refugees' return to western Bosnia, whose security will be guaranteed by the police forces of the three states.

[Unusan] It is a very happy circumstance that our visit to Croatia has coincided with the signing of the peace accord in Dayton, Ohio, because that circumstance has contributed to the resolution of the problem. I have to

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underline that we are very glad to see that trust has been placed in us, and that we are taking part in the efforts to resolve that very acute problem. During my stay in Croatia I have visited the refugee camp in Kuplensko and seen the conditions in which those people are living, and for that reason I am even happier that we can offer help.

[Toma] Have you talked yet with Fikret Abdic, as part of your effort aimed at settling the problem of refugees from western Bosnia?

[Unusan] No, I have not contacted him at all. In my opinion, Abdic should be barred from talks regarding the resolution of that problem. The situation in which those people find themselves is deplorable, indeed. They are wronged in any respect, and it is impossible to look at them as Abdic's army. We saw there women, children, youngsters, and that is no army, they are normal citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among those people there are some who did wrong, who support and represent Abdic's side, and they have to answer for that in some way. However, that is a matter that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia will resolve between themselves. [passage omitted]

[Toma] Can you tell us in which ways drugs are being smuggled through Turkey, and what methods your police use to prevent that?

[Unusan] Drugs are being smuggled through our country almost solely by road, and transported by huge trucks, in which particular storage compartments are usually built in for transportation of drugs. In Turkey each year we seize on average around 2,300 kilograms of heroin, around 15 metric tons of hashish, and around 30 tons of various pills.

[Toma] How large are quantities that successfully get through Turkey and further toward Europe?

[Unusan] Around 15 percent of the total mentioned above successfully gets through our country, and after that it is a matter that the police in Croatia, Germany and other European countries have to deal with. Of all those narcotics, heroin and any other that are being smuggled to Europe, 60 to 85 percent of them are being transported precisely by the Balkan route. Therefore cooperation between the police forces of the countries lying in that direction is necessary in order to be able to prevent smuggling of drugs quickly and successfully.

Terrorist Hideouts

[Toma] Are there any concrete results of the cooperation between the Croatian and the Turkish police concerning that problem?

[Unusan] After the signing of the agreement on cooperation, the police forces of the two countries are beginning with coordinated work on fighting that evil. My advice, not only to Croatia but to all other countries, is that they should not give a chance to members of the PKK [Kurdish Working Party] to freely travel through their countries, because it is one of the major organizations engaged in transport and smuggling of drugs.

[Toma] Can you tell us more about that organization?

[Unusan] It is engaged in smuggling and transport of people, weapons and munition, in drugs smuggling and all other unlawful activities. Just to illustrate this, the smuggling of people alone can be described in terms of hundreds and thousands of people, but this refers more to the region of Turkey and its neighboring countries. [passage omitted]

[Toma] To what extent is the problem of terrorism present in Turkey, and has your police been successful in dealing with it?

[Unusan] As for terrorism, in the past 10 years the Republic of Turkey has gained much experience regarding its prevention. By its geographic position alone Turkey is a fertile soil for all sorts of terrorism, from internal to international. As for its prevention, the greatest problem is that some countries are not cooperating, and are even encouraging and turning a blind eye to terrorism.

[Toma] Which countries?

[Unusan] I can openly say two countries — Greece and Syria. This refers to their attitudes toward Turkey, because in both Greece and Syria there are camps in which terrorists are being trained and equipped. Those two countries are thus sustaining terrorism that is directed against Turkey. As for other European countries that are sustaining terrorism, I could not say anything precisely, that is, I could not name them. However, there are many more such countries that are secretly backing up terrorism, and they are usually representing terrorist organizations as liberation movements. Precisely for that reason, and also in the field of struggle against that evil, one ought to establish good cooperation among police forces of many countries, because international terrorism no longer knows of borders, and it cannot be halted at a border.

Embargo on Accomplices

[Toma] Croatia is today being threatened by a terrorist organization called Gamma al Islamica. What would you, as the interior minister of a country that has positive experiences in the fight against that evil, advise the Croatian police to do?

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[Unusan] Your police knows best what to do, but it has to be done more on the international plane. All countries that are passively, openly or in any other way sustaining terrorism ought to be publicly identified, which means one should openly say which countries are involved, and impose an embargo against them.

[Toma] Would you, please, tell us to what extent extreme fundamentalist organizations from Islamic countries are really present in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Unusan] Islamic fundamentalists ought to be viewed solely as terrorists. They ought to be viewed through their structure and organization. In the republic of Turkey we have a lot of such groups of Islamic fundamentalists who occasionally take action. As for those fighters, they should be viewed differently, and generally through the prism of the motives that caused them to come here. Who are these people at all? Many of them fight for Islam, and even though they are called so, they are not really fundamentalists. It frequently happens that those organizations are doing more harm to one another, or doing something that is not their goal at all. I think that the governments of all states ought to pay greatest attention to this matter.

Commentary Analyzes Division of JNA Arsenal

AU1312155495 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Dec 95 p 6

[Commentary by Mario Galic: "Sixty Tanks and Three MiG's for Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a few days, we should be seeing the mutual recognition of Croatia and "Yugoslavia" and a complete normalization of relations between the two countries. Slovenia has already recognized "Yugoslavia" and soon all the other states, the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia republics, will do the same. The normalization of relations should lead to the beginning of the succession process.

The division of arms and equipment of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], subsequently appropriated by Serbia, should be a constituent part of the process. True, some of the arms were already captured in the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the majority were taken off to Serbia. Moreover, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] did not manage to keep a single weapon of the former JNA, because they formed part of the deal by which the JNA withdrew peacefully from the state. Certain percentages will be applied in the division, which means that Serbia will get 30 percent of the former JNA equipment, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 20 percent, while the other republics will each receive 10 percent. In addition to this, Serbia has also laid claim to Montenegro's 10 percent, so it will be claiming 40 percent of the former federal army's arsenal.

These percentages are not controversial. The controversy is what is to be divided and how it should be divided. For example, prior to the war in Slovenia, the former federal army had 1,850 tanks, of which only 300 were modern M-84 tanks, while 850 outdated T-54/55 tanks formed the basis of the armored forces. In addition to these, the JNA also had 700 antiquated T-34 and M-4 tanks, whose value in combat was very dubious. According to the division, "Yugoslavia" would get 120 M-84 tanks, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 60, while the other states would get 30 each. But, owing to the losses incurred during the war, the army of "Yugoslavia" today possesses fewer than 300 of these tanks (more precisely 232). A few are in the possession of rebel Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but these actually belong to Serbia. A further 60 were captured by the Slovene and Croatian Armies.

Of course, to cover its losses, Serbia has imported an unknown number of T-72 tanks from Russia, otherwise the number of modern tanks in the arsenal of its army would be significantly smaller. At the same time, the T-55 tank was already obsolete in the mid-1980's, and 10 years on their combat value is very minor. Moreover, these tanks are rather worn out and are in need of a complete overhaul. That is why it is far more useful to invest into the development and production of the supermodern Croatian tank, the Degman.

The former JNA in 1990 also possessed 1,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, and 19,030 artillery pieces (guns, howitzers, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers). Most of these ended up in Serbia.

Serbia has also entirely appropriated the air force of the former JNA, but today this is no longer very significant. The basic aircraft of this air force is still the outdated MiG-21. Only 14 modern MiG-29's had reached former Yugoslavia before the beginning of the war. Therefore, "Yugoslavia" would get six MiG-29's, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina three, and Slovenia and Macedonia one each. Of the remaining aircraft, only the Super Galebs (G-4) are of any interest, while the other product manufactured by Soko Mostar, the Orao, has proved to be completely useless in combat conditions, except for terrorist attacks on defenceless targets.

What remains are 120 Gazelle helicopters, which are still very good helicopters and would be worth having. All the more so as Croatia would get 24 helicopters, which is more than enough for its requirements.

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As far as the division of the former navy is concerned, its vessels are in such poor shape that they are simply not worth using. This is also true of the submarines, frigates, and rocket gunboats.

All in all, had the former JNA property been divided among the republics back in 1990, the states that emerged in the region of the former Yugoslavia would not have had too much. This does not mean that Croatia will be relinquishing a single weapon to which it is entitled, if not for the purpose of using it, then at least so that Serbia can never again use it against any other state. The other states will do the same, if, of course, the succession process ever happens.

The whole story is further complicated by the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There, the Bosnian-Croat Federation has a right to two-thirds of the 20 percent that belongs to Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Bosnian Serbs only have a right to a third. At this point, this ratio is quite the reverse, that is, the Bosnian Serbs have two to three times more arms than the Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, depending on the type of weapon in question. Theoretically speaking, the Serbs should be handing the greater part of their arsenal over to the Bosniaks and Croats. But this cannot be implemented in practice. It is now a major question whether a balance of force will ever be achieved or whether the Bosnian Serbs, with Belgrade's aid, will continue to be superior in terms of the amount and quality of their arsenal.

The succession also broaches the issue of dividing the property of the former JNA. This primarily includes the large munitions factories, mainly located in Bosnia and Serbia. At the same time, Macedonia has hardly any military industry. Slovenia has a small amount, while Croatia has a very strong special purpose shipbuilding industry. Investment in this industry was almost as large as investment in weapons, because the former Yugoslavia wanted to be almost completely independent of importing weapons. Sweden was the model. While there is a way of dividing the arsenal, it is difficult to decide how to divide the military industrial potential fairly, which is actually far more valuable than the weaponry itself. This part of the succession process has not yet been discussed.

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Justice Minister Survives No-Confidence Vote

LD1412115095 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 14 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We now go over to the Sejm with a report from Stanislawa Stec.

[Stec] Jerzy Jaskiernia is to remain in the post of justice minister. The Sejm rejected the motion to dismiss him with 125 deputies voting for dismissal, 215 voting against, and six abstaining. [The motion was submitted by opposition parties accusing the minister of abusing his office by supporting Aleksander Kwasniewski in the presidential election]. This is all from the Sejm.

Oleksy 'Analyzing' Walesa Remarks

LD1312210795 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy described as mysterious President Lech Walesa's remarks of yesterday about the evidence he had on international links of the postcommunist oligarchy. The prime minister said that he is analyzing these remarks and added that various other threats were voiced earlier by the outgoing president.

I think it is connected with the painful moment of the end of his term, Oleksy said. According to the prime minister, such remarks cause damage to the image of Poland and its internal law and order.

Dailies on Validity of Election Ruling, Kwasniewski

WS1412112195

[FBIS Editorial Report] On 12 November two major Warsaw vernacular dailies ran front-page commentaries on the ruling of the Supreme Court deeming the presidential elections valid. They criticized Aleksander Kwasniewski for having lied to voters.

Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA, a left-of-center independent daily, carries a 150-word commentary by Piotr Pacewicz under the title "He Has Not Apologized." The author writes: "We see two faces, each of them equally repulsive. The face of the crowd shouting that Kwasniewski is a traitor, praying in the streets that God prevent the red plague from spreading, and telling impartial judges to go to Moscow. The second is the suntanned, arrogant face of the president-elect. He is apologizing to his supporters because 'many of them suffered all this' while refusing to apologize to 'those who attacked me so brutally, so fiercely, so unfairly.' In other words, the president-elect is dividing Poles into friends who felt sorry for him and foes who are not even worth talking to." Pacewicz appeals to Aleksander Kwasniewski to apologize to the nation for lying. He concludes: "Maybe democracy will forgive him, maybe not. A lot still depends today on what he does."

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY runs a 300-word editorial by former Chief Editor Tomasz Wolek entitled "Conceit and Impunity." Wolek stresses that the verdict of the Supreme Court has to be respected. However, he goes on to say that "respect for a state office does not necessarily imply respect for whoever occupies it. No court has the power to rule that everyone show such respect." Recapitulating the charges that were brought against Aleksander Kwasniewski, Wolek concludes: "With a feeling of impunity, Kwasniewski has begun showing his arrogance and no longer hides how proud he is of his victory. He has broken the law and lied but feels shielded by the parliamentary immunity he now has and the presidential one he will soon acquire. In the December climate in Poland, his Spanish suntan turns out to be no more than plain veneer." [Kwasniewski recently returned from a holiday in Spain].

Majority: Kwasniewski Will Be Good President

WS1312140395 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by "KNYSZ": "CBOS on the President and the President-Elect; Kwasniewski Good or Bad?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *One in two adult Poles claims that Aleksander Kwasniewski will make a good president, a better one than Lech Walesa.*

The other half of those polled maintain that Lech Walesa was a good president. The Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] polled opinions on the president and the president-elect immediately after the second round of elections and before the Supreme Court ruled that the elections were valid.

One in three respondents is unable to say whether Kwasniewski will cope as president. A total of 13 percent—predominantly intellectuals in major cities—judge that Kwasniewski will be a bad president.

A huge majority of those who voted for Kwasniewski in the second round (as much as 86 percent) believe he will make a good president. None of those who cast their votes for the Democratic Left Alliance leader claim Kwasniewski will make a bad president.

Among those who voted for Walesa, however, 25 percent believe today that Kwasniewski will do well. This view is shared by the majority of the electorates of the Polish Peasant Party (84 percent), the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement (65 percent), the Union of Labor (62 percent), and the Union of Real Politics and the Freedom Union (54 percent each).

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The majority of the Christian National Union's electorate does not have an opinion; as many as 57 percent are unable to say how Kwasniewski will perform in office. The remaining supporters of the party—27 percent—claim that Kwasniewski will make a good president.

A negative opinion on Kwasniewski prevails only in the electorates of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, and Solidarity.

What will the president be like?

	Percent
Good	55
Bad	13
Difficult to say	32

* * *

The poll was carried out by CBOS between 24 and 29 November on a representative sample group of 1,175 adult Poles.

PC Head Thinks Working Under Walesa Impossible

LD1312165095 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1426 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Dec—The main political council of the Center Accord [PC] has decided that the "most reliable form of opposing the postcommunists' domination in the structures of the state is the establishment of the widest possible post-Solidarity coalition." According to the PC, to this end post-Solidarity groups should reach accord among themselves in local self-governments.

PC Chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski said during a news conference on Wednesday in Warsaw that local coalitions of post-Solidarity groups could bring about changes in the balance of forces in many self-governments, especially in provincial capitals. According to him, that would be a "good road" toward the establishment of an "anticommunist coalition," which would ensure for it the "necessary credibility. Talks at self-government level could begin immediately. These would test which of the post-Solidarity groups represent real forces and with whom talks could begin," he said.

But Kaczynski believes it is most likely that a single "anticommunist coalition" consisting of about a dozen post-Solidarity groups will not be established. According to the PC chairman, it is more likely that three political camps will be set up: one made up of the parties that support [former prime minister] Jan Olszewski, another organized around Lech Walesa, and one in which the main role will be played by the Freedom Union.

The PC leader supported Walesa's idea about putting up a joint list of right-wing groups in future parliamentary elections. At the same time, he added that he himself thought that working under the auspices of Walesa was impossible.

Freedom Union Head on Bloc Formation, Walesa

WS1412124595 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA (Koniec Tygodnia supplement) in Polish 8 Dec 95 p II

[Interview with Polish Freedom Union Chairman Leszek Balcerowicz by Zdzislaw Zaryczny; place and date not given: "An Efficient Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Zaryczny] Where can you see the natural electorate of the Freedom Union [UW] today?

[Balcerowicz] It consists primarily of entrepreneurs, of hundreds of thousands or even millions of small businessmen. Wherever I am, I always meet with young people, high school and university students. It also includes artistic circles, freelancers, as well as employees of the private sector, which has increased to 60 percent of the production sphere. Also, we will try to reach skilled workers in state-owned factories. These are the groups that are the easiest to reach and in which one can find the biggest number of people who believe that the great transformation in Poland was needed. This is our electorate. [passage omitted]

[Zaryczny] How long do you want to implement your strategy?

[Balcerowicz] Everyone who has any organizational experience knows that the process of reconstruction and strengthening of a party must take longer than six months—if we allow for the vacations, so much time has passed since I became UW chairman. Thus, this is a strategy for the next two years, until the parliamentary elections. I would not like them to be held earlier than that because this would be bad for the country. Frankly speaking, we, too, need some more time. The most important thing for us is to win the elections and form a government that will be able to implement a better platform than the platform of the present governing coalition.

[Zaryczny] Will UW be strong enough to achieve such a result?

[Balcerowicz] We will form various alliances. I would like to add at this point that I differentiate between

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political and issue-related alliances. If one makes a political alliance, one prepares a platform and a joint electoral ticket, after which the fight for power begins. At the same time, it is advisable to specify certain areas that may be the basis of issue-related alliances with those parties with which it will prove difficult to form a political alliance. Such areas might be, for example, privatization, social insurance reform, etc. There are two goals: first, to create a political alternative to the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], one that will not only win but will also govern the country better later on; second, to exclude certain issues from the ongoing political fight.

[Zaryczny] With whom do you want to create this alternative to the SLD?

[Balcerowicz] I would like to create it first of all with those whose platforms are the closest to us. I know that these are minor parties, but I really do respect them as partners. Talks are already under way with such parties as the Party of the Republicans, the Peasant-Christian Party, and the Conservative Party. Readiness to join such a platform-based alliance has been reported by a few other groups. Aside from holding these negotiations, we must also strengthen our party all the time and seek areas of possible cooperation with these organizations, such as with the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity [S], whose views and assessments are often similar to ours. If it turns out that there are enough similarities, it will be possible to extend the basic composition of the alliance. The most important thing is to avoid a situation in which a very wide bloc is formed right at the beginning—even though no agreements on its platform have been made—and if the bloc falls apart after some time. If such a platform-less bloc were formed, one that included many parties, from UW to S, then a considerable part of our electorate—people who support a free economy, church-state separation, etc.—might join the SLD voters for good. Thus, paradoxically, by forming a large bloc we would only strengthen the SLD. Therefore, I believe that a strategy of forming such a platform-less bloc is politically wrong. I am an advocate of a strategy involving platform agreements—one that would not pose a threat to the separate character of UW, which should be a lasting and, I hope, increasingly stronger party on the Polish political scene.

[Zaryczny] Many politicians and commentators believe that the only person who is able to construct such a wide bloc is Lech Walesa. Do you believe this is the role he should play?

[Balcerowicz] Lech Walesa has always himself defined his role on the Polish political scene; the same is surely going to happen this time. However, it was with interest and satisfaction that I received the news that he intends to set up an institute that would be a meeting place for the currently fragmented opposition; it would also be a forum where platform agreements could be reached. Lech Walesa went even as far as to propose a list of subjects, such as self-government, separation of politics from the economy, privatization. As I see it, he himself would like to oversee the conclusion of platform agreements. This is the direction and the philosophy that certainly appeals to me.

[Zaryczny] However, there also are other political centers in our country, such as the Polish Peasant Party, the Union of Labor, the Patriotic Camp, Jan Olszewski's camp, and others.

[Balcerowicz] In politics one has to hold talks, even if their sole purpose is to clear up misunderstandings, improve the atmosphere, and avoid unnecessary attacks. Having this in mind, we even met with the Confederation for an Independent Poland. We did not have any platform-based alliance in our minds because it would have been rather difficult to make; we only wanted to clear up misunderstandings—I call it an atmosphere-based alliance. I think we managed to decrease the intensity of attacks. [passage omitted]

[Zaryczny] Is UW going to cooperate with the power center headed by the new president?

[Balcerowicz] All those who keep asking about this probably do not really understand what democracy consists of. Well, it consists of a clear-cut division of roles: a division into those who are in power and those who are in opposition. Voters are only confused if this division is blurred. However, a good democracy does not exclude the possibility of cooperation between the opposition and those who are in power. Nonetheless, this cooperation must not result in the opposition's entering the President's Chancellery and receiving appointments to offices there. However, if the new president really strives to reach Poland's strategic goals, linked to integration into the EU and NATO, we will certainly not get in the way. This is the role of a responsible opposition.

[Zaryczny] Here is how Jan Maria Rokita [ousted from the UW leadership] once presented the fundamental dilemma that UW is facing: Does it want to be a decent party for elites, with 5-percent support in elections, or a mass party that can get as much as 20-25 percent support?

[Balcerowicz] I am, of course, an advocate of UW as a mass party. However, before this happens, many conditions must be met. I spoke about our strategy,

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about discipline and alliances, about all the things I call political marketing. In Poland a lot still depends on politics and politicians, so one cannot be indifferent to politics; it is worthwhile to give something up, not to regret after a couple of years that we passed up a big opportunity.

Government Explains Stance on Mass Enfranchisement

WS1312153195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Dec 95 p 9

[Article by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka: "A Different Look at Mass Enfranchisement. A Trap Set for the President"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Polish president's instruction on holding a referendum on mass enfranchisement of citizens, which was approved by the Senate in October, contains only one question: Do you support conducting mass enfranchisement of citizens? It also includes a timetable for preparations for the referendum. It envisions that voivodship commissions for the referendum will be set up by 29 December of this year, and information about the boundaries and numbers of constituencies and commission headquarters will be published by 13 January 1996. District commissions for the referendum will be appointed by 27 January. On 17 February, commission chairmen will receive lists of people eligible to participate in the referendum, scheduled for 18 February 1996.

In light of the hermetism of the question and popularity of the slogan of mass enfranchisement, one may expect that a majority of citizens will say "yes," despite the fact that in general they do not understand the slogan.

A Different View

Asked about mass enfranchisement during a meeting with local journalists, Prime Minister Josef Oleksy said that there is no controversy over enfranchisement. Yet the government has a different view on mass participation in privatization from that the president. It believes that this participation will take place through [investment] funds.

This different view also consists in the fact that, in the opinion of the government, it is the current commitments that should be fulfilled first.

What To Enfranchise

"I confirm what I said in the Senate, that it is a trap set for a new president, all the more so since the question concerning mass enfranchisement is addressed without defining the scope of the substance of the project. I said this not knowing who would become the new president," Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek told us. In his opinion, if one understands mass enfranchisement as another version of the program for national investment funds or payments from the budget of bills to a considerable part of Polish society, meaning commitments to pensioners, the budget sector, or people who expect compensation for nationalized property, or if it is a matter of reforming the pension system, the government says "yes."

So what will the government do should the answer to the referendum be "yes"?

"The government will consistently adhere to the stance it has presented thus far, and the government's stance is no secret, nor is it a secret how the government understands the issue of enfranchisement and the use of state property to enfranchise society," the privatization minister states. "We have taken an inventory of the property that is still state-owned, and we have conducted a rough estimate of possible bills to be paid by using this property, and these two sides are balanced." [passage omitted]

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Chebeleu Welcomes Implementation of Dayton Accords

AU1412114495 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania welcomes the laborious way and the practical spirit in which the Dayton accords have been put into practice, the freeing of the two French pilots, which eased the continuation of the diplomatic process, the arrival in Bosnia of the first military echelons to make logistical preparations, as well as the beginning of the activity regarding the persons who have been dislocated and the refugees, stated Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, the spokesman of the Romanian Presidency, during his weekly news conference today.

He also appreciated the positive way in which Romania's offer—to involve itself further, under the circumstances of the current new phase, by participating, with logistical support, in the international forces that are to be deployed in Bosnia, as well as in the reconstruction process—was accepted, our correspondent, Sorin Croitorescu, reports.

Answering a question, the presidential spokesman reasserted the fact that Romanian-Ukrainian negotiations on the conclusion of the basic treaty are to be continued and that there is no problem whatsoever between Romania and Ukraine regarding Snakes Island [in the Black Sea], as the issue merely concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries, our correspondent reports.

General Discusses Participation in Bosnia Mission

AU1412135395 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 9 Dec 95 p 11

[Article by M.S.: "The Romanian Army May Send a Field Hospital and Logistic Units to Former Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Army Corps General Dumitru Cioflina, the chief of the Romanian Army General Staff, made a statement in the middle of the current week saying that Romania has not yet made a decision on the participation of the Romanian Army in the peacekeeping and reconstruction process in former Yugoslavia.

The only thing available at this time is a solution elaborated by the MApN [National Defense Ministry], by which they intend to engage the ministry without implying combat forces, but merely ensuring facilities in technical, sanitary, and social assistance. In that context, the Romanian Army may deploy a field hospital, units to rebuild the electricity and communication networks, consultation teams in various domains, intervention teams, and, if so requested, solely raw and other materials.

All these actions, Gen. Cioflina pointed out, will be carried out at the taxpayers' expenses, that is, they will be paid for by Romania. The chief of the Army General Staff also emphasized the fact that Romania will be requested to assist depending on the needs of the three forces that have already divided responsibility in that region among them, that is, of the Russian, French, and British forces.

Spokesman on 'Strain' With Ukraine Over Borders

AU1312155895 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the weekly news conference of the Foreign Ministry's spokesman, Gabriel Gafita, director of the Analysis, Strategy, and Document Drafting Group, referred to the half-yearly meeting of the Council of Europe that will take place in Madrid on 16 December. On this occasion, a third meeting of the heads of state and government from EU countries and the associated states from Central Europe will take place there, which will also be attended by a Romanian delegation headed by President Ion Iliescu.

Answering questions from correspondents regarding Snakes Island [Insula Serpilor], the director of the Analysis, Strategy, and Document Drafting Group, Mr. Gabriel Gafita said that Romania and Ukraine are currently not at the stage of discussing or planning to discuss border or territorial issues. According to Mr. Gafita, the discussions on Snakes Island have created a certain emotional strain that, the Romanian side hopes, will be diluted in the coming period. Mr. Gafita reminded those present that the foreign ministers of Romania and Ukraine, Messrs. Teodor Melescanu and Hennadiy Udovenko, agreed in London last week that the two countries should continue their dialogue at the prime ministerial level on finalizing a basic political treaty. Regarding the departure of Ukraine's ambassador for Kiev yesterday, Mr. Gafita said that, before his departure, Ambassador Oleksandr Chaliy met with the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, with whom he examined the issue of setting a date, as soon as possible, for the meeting between the two prime ministers. Mr. Gafita said that Ambassador Chaliy's departure for Kiev does not mean that he was recalled for consultations, rather that he has embarked on a normal ambassadorial trip home. One of the purposes of this trip is to discuss with the Ukrainian Government the details of the planned meeting between the two prime ministers, our correspondent, Doina Saiciuc, reports.

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Iliescu 'Concerned' About Iron Guard Movement

AU1412080495 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 8 Dec 95 p 4

[Article by Floriana Jucan: "Ion Iliescu Calls on All State Institutions To Prevent the Rise of the Iron Guard Movement in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the news conference that was held on 7 December at Bucharest's Cotroceni Palace, presidential spokesman Traian Chebeleu said that one of President Iliescu's major concerns is the attempts to revive the Iron Guard movement.

"The presidency is concerned about the fact that today, Iron Guard ideologists do not attach any importance to or show respect for democracy," said Traian Chebeleu, "and they advocate the method of assassination as a form of punishing political opponents."

"Just as alarming are also some public events, such as the so-called Iron Guard camp at Padina, the march organized at Tincabesti, or the appearance of a declared Iron Guard press, publication of books and magazines, or the Iron Guard propaganda made in a more or less disguised form even on television."

As the spokesman of Cotroceni said at the end of his statement, Ion Iliescu called on all state institutions "to do all they can in order to prevent the rise of the Iron Guard movement, which represents a direct threat to the diplomatic evolution of our political life."

Vacaroiu: No Special Status for Minorities

AU1312204595 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 13 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu received today the delegation of the French Parliament to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe led by Jean Claude Vignon, currently paying an official visit to Romania.

The meeting was attended by Florin Radulescu Botica, president of the Romanian parliamentary delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and Bernard Boyer, France's ambassador in Bucharest.

The prime minister extensively discussed the stage of the reform's implementation at a legislative level, providing a number of details regarding the modifications proposed by the executive to the law on local public administration. Within this context, the Romanian prime minister emphasized the fact that efforts are being made to support the authorities of local powers, including the associations of citizens who belong to national minorities. Romania ensures all individual rights of citizens who belong to minorities, but it does not accept a special status for any of them, the head of the executive emphasized.

As regards the French investments in Romania, the prime minister expressed his hope that making use of all facilities available to foreign investors, the French businessmen will be among our country's first partners as far as the volume of achieved investments is concerned, reads a press release we have received from the government.

New Military Attaches Appointed to Egypt, Israel

AU1412140095 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11 Dec 95 p 8

[Report by Radu Tudor: "New Military Attaches Appointed: Colonel Dumitru Dumitrescu to Cairo, and Lieutenant Colonel Aurel Stanciu to Tel Aviv"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two representatives of the Romanian Army recently took up their posts as military attaches, at locations of major importance for our national defense system.

Thus, Colonel Dumitru Dumitrescu, formerly Romania's military attache in Rome and former head of the Foreign Relations Section of the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Army General Staff, was appointed Romanian military attache in Cairo.

Lieutenant Colonel Aurel Stanciu, former commander of the Otopeni airport, former deputy head of the ROMAVIA air company, has taken over the post of Romania's military attache in Tel Aviv.

Both appointments were made with the approval of Army Corps General Dumitru Cioflina, chief of the Army General Staff, on a proposal made by Division General Dr. Decebal Ilina, head of the Military Intelligence Directorate.

Draft Law on Local Public Administration Debated

AU1412120995 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During its session today, the Romanian Senate continued the debates on the draft law on local public administration. They passed Article 54 of the law, referring to the language used by the citizens in their contacts with local public administration authorities.

According to the text of the article, the language to be used is Romanian, but citizens belonging to ethnic minorities may also turn to the authorities, both orally and in writing, in their mother tongues.

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Disagreeing with the contents of the aforementioned article, as well as with the paragraph stipulating that such written requests and documents have to be accompanied by their officially certified translation into Romanian, the representatives of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] walked out of the session hall, temporarily, as they said, reports our correspondent, Dan Preda.

Currently, the Senate is holding emergency debates on the draft law authorizing the government to rule by ordinances [during the winter Parliament recess], after which they are to continue discussions on the draft law on local public administration.

New Draft Law on Privatization Process Approved

AU1312172895 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In today's plenary session, the Senate approved the draft law on modifying and supplementing Law No. 55/1995 on accelerating the privatization process. According to the new draft law, ownership bonds and nominal privatization coupons can be registered with the various trading companies until 31 March 1996 or with the Private Property Funds until 30 April 1996, inclusively. The Senate has also passed an amendment allowing the registration of nominal privatization coupons with authorized real estate companies and shareholding companies. [passage omitted]

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Expert Interviewed on Outcome of Succession Talks

AU1312144795 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 8 Dec 95 pp 37-39

[Untitled interview with Miran Mejak, chief of the Slovene negotiating team on the SFRY succession, by Danilo Slivnik; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Slivnik] The talks about the division of the former joint Yugoslav assets have been at a standstill for some time. The Dayton peace agreement took us somewhat by surprise. Was Slovenia prepared for it?

[Mejak] I could say that we were prepared. In 1992, we claimed that in this entire affair we were only interested in the division of assets and nothing more. Otherwise, we were more of less merely observers in the peace negotiations. When they tried to get us involved in the debate about the future Yugoslav market in various economic commissions we always refused. We maintained that trade with Serbia interested us as much as trade with Austria and Hungary, and not a bit more, although we encountered ideas about a sort of "new Yugoslav economic integration" with some Europeans. [passage omitted]

[Slivnik] All this time Slovenia has been faced with the dilemma of how to tackle the resolution of the succession issues. Should stick strictly to the legal way, as it has been doing over the past four years, or try other ways? The Dayton agreement can lead to some of our problems being resolved in defiance of the prevailing rules, especially if Croatia also favors this. Were we, perhaps, not trapped into waiting for a peace agreement of which we can already say that it will probably not acknowledge Slovene interests?

[Mejak] As for the Slovene position on the succession, the Serbs have "helped us" by espousing completely opposite views. We must have an absolutely clear platform now, because their standpoint was that Yugoslavia did not disintegrate, that we were the ones who seceded, and were therefore "the rebels." As rebels, we supposedly do not have much to hope of gaining anything from the division of assets. In their addresses they also denied the 1974 Constitution, which in a way divided the former state assets among economic subjects. Because they were constantly drafting lists of assets that we gained after 1945, and because they even tried to calculate "the years of service" for the Yugoslav Peoples' Army soldiers and "charge" it to us, the whole thing became so ludicrous that we could not reach an agreement in the commission.

It is true that all the successors of the former state were in specific situations (also Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — FYROM]), and so forth. However, we, the Slovenes, were the only ones in the negotiations with Belgrade who could not give any concessions and could only quote the Vienna convention. The Belgrade side was not willing to create any possibility for any sort of an agreement unless we admitted that we were the rebels and that we seceded illegally....

Others have their own interests. Regarding the succession, Bosnia-Herzegovina was our sincere ally. However, it was involved in a war and, thus, could not think about the succession the way we did. We must also respect the Croatian interests. Just look how much of their territory was occupied; they had to arm themselves and at the end they resolved some problems effectively. What remained can only be solved in a diplomatic way, and that is what the Croats are doing. Theoretically, we can hold this against them, however, I personally, understand them. The territory where they have oil is still under occupation, and I understand that they are also willing to give something in exchange for it.

When the latest resolution on the suspension of the economic measures against FRY was passed we prepared our amendments. However, what can Slovene diplomacy do when the five biggest nations agree on something? In any case, we were only a sort of "a nuisance." [passage omitted]

[Slivnik] What will happen if Croatia recognizes the FRY's continuity?

[Mejak] Nothing, they say, as the succession would be separated from recognition. However, I personally, think that it is not wise to recognize the FRY's political continuity. Namely, this would mean that all the rest of us are "the rebels," while the JLA [the Yugoslav Peoples Army] seemingly defended the Constitution when it shelled Vukovar and the Bosnian towns. Everybody must judge this by himself.

We do agreed to ignore the war reparations in the succession. Namely, this is what the Badinter commission ruled.

[Slivnik] Why, in your opinion, are the Croats verging toward recognition of FRY continuity?

[Mejak] The Croats are very pragmatic. All this probably involves some sort of territorial concession. However, it is difficult for us to reproach them for anything. They are a sovereign state and can act in accordance with their interests.

[Slivnik] What about the Bosnian delegation, was it consistent?

[Mejak] Yes, we cooperate very well with the Bosnians.

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[Slivnik] What about the Macedonians?

[Mejak] They are exerting pressure on them, although I am convinced that there are also many people in Skopje who believe that Macedonia [FYROM] should link itself with Belgrade more. At the end of the day, its first state holiday is 29 November, as that was the date when they first got their own state. This is an absurd fact that confirms the existence of things in the former Yugoslavia that are luring many back.

[Slivnik] In the negotiations the Slovenes will, therefore, have to confront Croatia and Serbia and will perhaps be helpless. Can it happen that we will not inherit anything, and that we will have to add this loss to the cost of acquiring independence? Will Slovenia know how to be pragmatic in the next few months?

[Mejak] In Geneva, for example, they have already asked us why we were complaining so much, as allegedly "Ljubljana was more beautiful than Vienna." This means that we could encounter great problems in the negotiations and that we may not get what we want. Namely, it can happen that the main initiators of the peace process will wrap up the succession business very quickly. The first part (archives and so forth) will probably be decided in our favor. However, it will be difficult as regards the finances. We will probably have to pay a lot more in debts than we will get from the joint assets, and all this solely because many (also in the European Union) will say that "we are richer than other Yugoslav states." Of course, we will have to sign the agreement nevertheless, because in the opposite case we could get ourselves into lot of trouble. Whether our parliament will accept this or not is another matter. The dilemma will remain, however, because in the case of our not signing they could say in Brussels that "one actually cannot deal with the Slovenes" and that we always want to do things our way. Of course, we will negotiate on this adamantly.

[Slivnik] Can the result of the succession talks be in anyway connected with our negotiations on associate EU membership?

[Mejak] Probably not. However, it can create an unpleasant impression because some of the countries at the forthcoming international conferences (for example, the French in Paris) will strive very hard for success, and will not be thrilled if somebody belittles them. It would be best for us if the succession talks lasted for another 10 years rather than to pass something that would not suit us at all — of course, under the condition that the joint assets remained frozen in the meantime. However, we must not leave the conference and — regardless of what may be passed — say that our parliament will not adopt it. We must not be the ones to slam the doors shut. It is better that others force us into something than our rebelling. As you know, we are not short of enemies.

[Slivnik] Has Slovenia embarking on separate talks with the commercial banks been useful?

[Mejak] Very much, because the Badinter arbitration commission determined the share of the debts and, thus, excluded us from the "Belgrade package." [passage omitted]

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Federal

Paris Signing 'Crowning Glory' of Peace Efforts

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["Pool" item; By Momo Pudar]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, Dec 12 (TANJUG) — Exhausted by weeks of strikes and protests, Paris is yet ready to receive on Dec. 14 the delegations that should formally sign the peace accord for the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The last cloud looming on the horizon has been cleared away by the release on Tuesday of French airmen Frederic Chiffot and Jose Souvignet, who were captured in late August when their Mirage 2000 was shot out of the sky over Bosnia. The airmen had been taking part in NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb military and civilian targets.

The signing of peace for Bosnia will at long last make official the new geo-political map of former Yugoslav lands, attended as it will be by mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic ties among the new states created after the breakup of former Yugoslavia. This will certainly facilitate the solution of the accumulated problems.

However, there still remains to define future 'specific relations' with the neighbouring countries of the two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina — the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska — which are equal under the Nov. 21 Dayton Accord. France fears for the survival of the Muslim-Croat Federation, according to Foreign Minister Herve de Charette, who has said that a new initiative and new actions are needed to complete the Dayton Accord, as the Bosnian situation is still difficult and volatile.

The 50 or so world statesmen, when they gather at Paris, will focus attention, among others, on coordinating in detail their positions on the mission of the NATO-led International Peace Implementation Force (I-FOR). They will discuss also the deployment of an international police force to secure guarantees to the Serbs in Sarajevo, and the problem of 'military balance.'

Military balance should not mean any new amassing of weapons in Bosnia, and the European partners are critical of the United States because of Washington's apparent intention of arming and training Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic's professional army.

Diplomatic sources see the Paris conference as an opportunity to examine, with a lot of political goodwill on all sides, relations among the Western partners and their positions on the post-war operation in Bosnia. The presence at the conference of U.S. President Bill Clinton, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, British Prime Minister John Major and the host, French President Jacques Chirac, will be of importance in 9this context.

The historic signing ceremony is seen in Paris as the crowning glory of years of peace efforts and as signalling that all of Europe is entering a period of stability and can now direct its energies to creating a new system of security and a new continental order.

Serbia

Draskovic Comments on War, Peace, Milosevic

AU1412113295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 December 95 p 8

[Commentary by Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic: "The War and Peace of Serbia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian president brought with him from Dayton the agreement on peace and the suspension of the sanctions imposed against our state. This is good, regardless of the fact that he did not extinguish someone else's war at that U.S. military base, and regardless of the fact that he did not lead our people out of the isolation into which someone else pushed it.

I do not want to join those who accuse Milosevic of having betrayed the Serbs on the other side of the Drina River and disgraced those on this side. He simply accepted what had to be accepted. In the choice between the wishes of the whole world and war against the whole world, he opted for the first, but with a delay of several years.

For an unpardonably long and tragic period for the present generation, and for many in the future, he "courted" our national hysteria, the lack of common sense, our fascism and Nazism, bad politicians and noisemakers, the apostles of hatred and insanity, the same phalanx — in other words — that has declared him the biggest traitor to his country.

Riding the drunken horse of such "patriots," Milosevic started a senseless war against everybody in Yugoslavia, which was followed by the war against Europe and the whole world. Riding on our unhappiness, he led us into isolation from the world and made everybody detest us. Any resistance to the shame, every voice of common sense and the outcry of the courageous were severely punished with the rage of the herd.

The screaming of the ruling party, and the television and other propaganda about the "just peace" reached in Dayton, are more than inhuman.

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At a grave you either cry or at least you are silent. Hundreds of thousands of dead and crippled, millions of homeless. So many destroyed towns and villages, destroyed lives, centuries wiped away.

Things happened that one could not imagine would ever happen. There are no more Serbs in Knin and around the Krka River, and Serbs were there even at a time before they lived in Belgrade. There are no longer any Serbs in Mostar, Drvar, Petrovac, Grahovo.... This is the "just peace."

And where is Serbia? In rags, in the refugees' bags, in lines of people waiting for emigration, shaken by fear of policemen's clubs and the Mafia. This is the "just peace."

This is the moment when all culprits must look at miles of fresh crosses on graves, at the empty sleeves and trousers of youngsters, at black flags and scarves, at Carnojevic's followers without hope, at general poverty and trouble, and bow their heads because of the biggest defeat of our people, and not run away from the court of humanity and God.

When the president started accepting many of our anti-war attitudes, I did not change over to the side of warmongers, dealers, and lunatics in order to oppose Milosevic. I supported and encouraged him to remain persistent in his intention to put an end to the war, since both gasoline and water were in his hands.

Had we acted in a different way, had the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], as the party of young people and recruits, "set up camp" in Pale, it is certain that the president would have been forced to refuse the can with water and take the one with gasoline, which would have stirred up a war in which both Serbia and our complete nation would have been burned out.

Peace is something we wanted very much, so Milosevic put his signature under the peace agreement in Dayton. This peace is neither just nor unjust. It consists of blood and tears, of illusion and deceit, of crimes and misery, of deceit by various rogues, of ideological and Mafia patriotism, of shame and wounds that will take a long time to heal, of the unbelievable destiny of millions of innocent people, of nonsense and evil in both us and others. Peace is the only way out, however, the only hope and possibility to enable the still unborn to be born and give them a life that will not resemble ours.

If we do not want our children's lives to resemble ours, a future Serbia must not resemble the present Serbia. We need immediate changes, our state needs foundations and a roof, aims, and strategies.

We simply have to change everything that has caused this deluge — the deterioration of our people, state, culture, and morale: our system, ideology, myths, and the system of values.

I am not one of those who claim that Germany was defeated when the Red Army entered Berlin in 1945. The Russian army only defeated German Nazism then, the biggest evil of the German nation. A big victory for Germans and Germany arose from the peace created by that defeat.

Unfortunately, the brave Russian soldier did not defeat the evil in his own house, so that the Satanic peace proliferated throughout decades like cancer and destroyed the Soviet Union from the inside before the eyes of our generation.

When Knin fell and masses of Serbs went into exile from their centuries-old country, I proposed that the program for national recovery be accepted without hesitation, as the way into a new Serbia. The way from the past into the future, from decline into recovery, from hatred into reconciliation, from the totalitarian regime into democracy, from no one's into private ownership, from the Mafia economy into a modern legal system, from poverty into wealth, from Asia to Europe. I required that Serbia be brought back to its own self from the intellectual point of view, that it be given its coat of arms, its national anthem, and that it should not celebrate the ideological holidays of hatred, such as 7 July [beginning of resistance in Serbia in World War II]. I hit a wall. Those who lead Serbia today — even after this war and all the horror that we have experienced — seem to be closer to 1941, the year in which their parents lived, than to the age of their children that lies ahead of us.

By defending the dead past, they exploit some unhappy circumstances and misrepresent them.

The first one is that a large number of people in the present hell looks back with joy about the life before this war, like a crippled person who dreams of the feet he lost but not of the mine that destroyed them. The desperate people who were made unhappy by this war, by the system, in other words, which gave rise to the war, are now being offered the same system, although it has turned millions of people into crosses on graves, pushed them into wheelchairs, made them homeless and beggars. Apart from that, they also threaten them.

Another good circumstance for the supporters of the communist past is that some opposition parties offer Serbia and the Serbs a pit deeper than their own. The "national patriots," this is the name they gave themselves, are furious not because Milosevic — together

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with them — started this war, but because he stopped the crazy war. These "patriots" support total pestilence, so that those who at least succeeded in stopping it, seem saviors compared to them.

Serbia of European changes and opinions, Serbia of young people and intelligentsia, Serbia of inventors and builders, Serbia as the only factor that can force the Serbs into exile, is wedged between two endeavors that are now in a state of collapse. The red, communist one, which brings a long and painful death, and the black, Nazi one, which guarantees a much quicker death.

Serbia in Europe and Europe in Serbia! This is the third way, which we insist on, and because of which we encountered the curse from both the red and the black.

I am scared, however, that this end of the tunnel might be closed, because the rulers will cut out many of the points in our program, and do the opposite in fact. Is this not the case with our concept of privatization? Do the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and JUL [Yugoslav United Left] not express their love of Europe and the United States of America, and pray to God at the same time that communists be established in the Kremlin again? They seem to have given the right turn signal and then driven to the left. So much deceit has been successful, why not this one?

On the same day that he set out for Dayton, the Serbian president signed a law in Belgrade according to which tens of thousands of young men from Serbia who did not want to "volunteer" in the war and fled the country, are deprived of the right to inherit property from their parents! Serbian children have practically been declared legally dead, because they refused to participate in the war, and in Dayton our delegation swore that Serbia supported peace from the very beginning, and that it had not participated in the war.

The president has led himself into a trap from which there is no way out.

By acting like this he has forced the world to be cautions, very cautious, as it questions both his signature and his words. That is why the sanctions have not been lifted, but suspended, in Dayton. Our state has been released from isolation on parole. The world wants to check whether this has been yet another bluff. If this is a deceit, Serbia will be returned to prison.

The Serbian president must open a new page and convince the world and the Serbian citizens that he has from the long and horrible years of death and decay learned something for the state and human morale.

This is not difficult, and it does not hurt. It is enough if he understands and accepts that Serbia must not be sacrificed any longer, neither to itself nor its ideology, that — on the contrary — any ideology must be subordinated to Serbia. He must give up everything from which his party or he personally would profit if this pushes the state and the majority of its citizens into disaster. And vice versa. He is obliged to accept every change that can lead us out of the present mud and shame, even at the price of losing his ideological, party, or any other convictions and monopolies.

The ruling system in Serbia has really succeeded in killing the hope, the strength, and the wish for resistance in our people. Life, any kind of life, is accepted as a reward.

A break has come. People, tired of "war in peace and of peace in war," impoverished and sad, are waiting, but they will not wait for ever. Thunder always comes after a break.

I would like it to be the thunder of quick and decisive changes in Serbia, the changes that will defeat the causes of our national defeat. I do not want the suffering in Serbia to go on, I do not want streets and squares to start implementing changes once people are no longer patient.

President Milosevic can postpone these beneficial changes, but he can neither avoid nor prevent them. He can, naturally, support and accelerate them. It depends mostly on him when European changes will happen, and how and when Serbia will get them.

It must be remembered, however, that the right to wait has already been used up. (The author is the chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement).

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